INTEGRATION AND DIVERSITY IN

THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Edited by

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Nordic Baltic Studies

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In memory of

INTA BRIKSE

Et ne fut jamais au monde deux opinions pareilles, non plus que deux poils ou deux grains. Leur plus universelle qualité, c'est la diversité.

— Montaigne, *Essais*, 1580

If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help the world safe for diversity.

— John F. Kennedy, Address, American University, 1963

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Foreword

The Norwegian – Baltic conference *Perspectives on integration and diversity in the Baltic Sea Region* was held at Oslo and Akershus University College (HIOA) on the 21st and 22nd of November 2013. The conference was the result of a longstanding cooperation between member of staff at HIOA and the University of Latvia and we were happy to welcome more than 40 participants from various departments and institutions both in Norway and abroad.

In spite of their differences, Norway and the Baltic states deal with issues related to integration and diversity on a daily basis. The challenges are seen in various areas of public life, and will need cooperative efforts in order to be dealt with in the future. Thus, the intention of the conference was to discuss and shed light on some perspectives on public policy, research and education in the areas of social work and policy, public administration, media, library and communication studies.

The high quality of the papers and the discussion represent the thinking and experience of men and women experts in their particular fields. Their contributions helped to make the Conference an interesting arena for sharing of these thoughts, and also a meeting ground for future collaboration and projects.

In these proceedings of the conference we have gathered eight papers which we hope will create a background for the future collaboration.

Kristel Mari Skorge

Head of department of Public Administration

Preface

The Comparative method, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1857-1917) claimed, was not one of many social research methods, it was *the* method. Even if it is easy to agree with Durkheim, actually to design comparative research strategies is more difficult. In contrast, Norwegian philosopher Jon Elster has claimed that the logic of a system might get lost by studying it in light of other systems. Then again, one could argue that the uniqueness of the specific system or practice becomes even more visible when compared to others.

In this book we have gathered articles focusing on different social and political aspects of Norway and the Baltic countries with regard to issues of diversity and integration. Our aim is to seek out critical analyzes and controversial positions that can deepen our understanding of developments in their respective fields, such as law, politics, social policy, and the media. This intention is obviously not a "strategy of the most similar case," but an effort to stimulate thinking about comparative research questions. However, can we actually compare Norway – with its modern history as a welfare state with political freedom – to countries that were once part of the Russian empire, and that after a brief period of independence were suppressed by communist dictatorship for a large part of the 20th century? A quote from Karl Marx might illustrate the point, as the great philosopher – and politically misused theoretician – wrote: *"Men make their own history, but they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but rather under circumstances already existing, given and transmitted from the past."*

History has not gone away, but a rapid transformation has taken place: The Baltic peoples got their freedom from the Soviet Union in 1991. This is a short period in history, yet already more than two decades that provide enough time to summa-

rize developments and point at unresolved issues challenging policies of integration and equality of social groups in each country.

The countries of the Baltic Sea Region face political challenges in globalization, Europeanization, and the condition of the welfare state in societies characterized by greater diversity. The chapters in this book provide current perspectives on public policy and research in the fields of politics and governance, media and information, and health policy.

The contributors address issues of diversity across a wide specter of social phenomena of concern to students of Baltic and Nordic societies, including income, social capital, information access, religion, gender, ethnicity, and immigration. In addition the authors also demonstrate diversity in their use of theoretical foundations and reference disciplines, and in their choice of methods. All in all these contributions give the reader an idea about several promising approaches to the study of a broad range of diversity and integration issues in the Baltic Sea Region.

Magid Al-Araki is a leading researcher on the scholarship of the classic Arab philosopher and sociologist Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406). Here we are dealing with a thinker who has rightly been characterized as forerunner for sociology as a science. Khaldūn's method was materialistic, stressing the impact of organization, society and political leadership. Al-Araki is referring to Ibn Khaldūn's most important work, *Muqaddimah*, an astonishing modern book, given the fact that this was written more than 600 years ago. Ibn Khaldūn contends that while founding rulers seek to establish lasting dynasties, forces of disintegration leads to their downfall within a few generations. From this can be postulated that societies will develop according to cycles rather than linear trajectories.

Jānis Ikstens discusses a topic widely scrutinized in traditional western political science and sociology, but that is rather new to the Baltic area: the representation of women in parliament, and the impact of changes in the electoral system. What has Latvia achieved in this field after the democratic revolution? Since the fall of communism, the share of elected female candidates has increased from 15 to 21 %, but which influence can be found from the changes in the electoral systems of 2010? Female voters hold the majority in Latvia, but still there is a male dominance. The interesting news, however, is that this situation has slightly changed with the reforms of 2010, when the new rules required more candidates to be placed on party lists.

Integration and diversity are two main fields of both political and academic discussion. How to relate this to the human rights is the starting point for *Julia Köhler-Olsen*. She is pointing to the different understandings of these concepts. Interpreting them within the framework of a human right-based approach, she concludes ambitiously that the complex lives of individuals must be integrated into policy design and implementations.

No less important is the ongoing discussion of a modernization of the public sector. Modernization has become quite a slogan, but what does it actually mean? *Harald Koht and Iveta Reinholde* stress the importance of the well-driven bureaucracy, reminding us of what this can be without the Weber-inspired aspects of modernity. The authors remind us of the pre-modern condition before the modern bureaucracy, with its unforeseen consequences. Concerning today's situation in Norway and Latvia the writers are outspoken: The Norwegian case-workers seem so rule-oriented that they may appear rigid in their interpretation of client rights, whereas the case of Latvia may face more dangerous problems: The fear of reprisals expressed by Latvian case workers may be a sign of the arbitrariness of pre-Weberian public administration.

Kristin Skare Orgeret sets out to take a closer look at the freedom of expression and the role of the media in a European perspective. First, the media history of Latvia and Norway is shortly presented, then she focuses on the challenges of today's journalism in Europe. Given the European crisis, one might experience serious threats to European democracies. The right to free expression and freedom of information can only exist where the media, journalists, and people participating in public debate feel secure, Orgeret writes. Concerning this, there are indeed some clouds on the European skies.

Mihail Rodins and Alex Gaponenko take up the topic of ethno-political conflicts and diversities due to the different national identities in Latvia. Their article points to the many actual and potential conflicts regarding the different nationalities. The authors measure the impact of phenomena like economic inequality, economic crisis, threat of assimilation and lack of citizenship, as well as other aspects of the conflicts coming from national struggles. The rather dramatic conclusion is that the integrative resources in Latvia appear to be exhausted, and the rhetoric on integration causes irritation and only vague associations.

Juris Rozenvalds takes a closer look at Latvia in a Baltic context, with respect to diversity management and sustainability. The heritage from the Soviet period has left the country with a considerable Russian minority. A quick and easy consolidation within the Latvian society is not to be expected, but as Rozenvalds underlines; it is important to make choices today that might promote a sustainable development of the Latvian state and nation in the future.

In the last chapter the researchers *Geir C. Tufte, Catharina Bjørkquist, and Iveta Renholde* deal with Norway and Latvia with respect to the joint program of "health in all policies". Interesting results have been identified: In Norway lifestyle

diseases and child poverty were seen as the most important challenges, whereas in Latvia alcoholism and a limited access to health care service were the focus of attention.

All articles have been selected, reviewed and proofread by the editors. Responsibility for content, however, remains with the authors. This publication is dedicated to the memory of **Inta Brikse**, late and beloved dean of the Social Science Faculty of the University of Latvia.

Harald Koht *Pål Veiden*

Editors

Chapter 1

Ibn Khaldūn's Thoughts and Today's Societal Conditions

Abdel Magid Al-Araki[1]

The plan of this chapter is fourfold. First I open with how ignorance of the innate nature of conditions prevailing in social organization invites to falsehood and misinterpretations. Then, I highlight how decay during the fourth generation destroys civilization. Next, I discuss injustice and how it leads to the destruction of civilization. Finally, I conclude with the argument that justice requires political leadership.

The paper is mainly based on an understanding of the monumental work of Ibn Khaldūn, the Muqaddimah. There are many versions of the Muqaddimah, both in Arabic and different other languages, on the Internet and in different libraries throughout the world. One of the reliable Arabic manuscripts is controlled by Quatremère (Ibn Khaldun, 1858). The Muqaddimah is translated to French by De Slane (Slane, 1862) and to English by Rosenthal (A. Ibn Khaldūn, 1967) It is abridged by Dawood (A Ibn Khaldūn, 1967). I have presented a magistergrad on Ibn Khaldūn to the University of Oslo (A. M. Al-Araki, 1983) and in 2012 translated (Ibn & al-Araki, 2012) the Arabic original of the Muqaddimah into Norwegian. The interpretation of the thoughts of Ibn Khaldūn draws on all these sources.

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Falsehood due to ignorance of conditions

In the general introduction to his *Muqaddimah* and under the heading «Untruth naturally afflicts historical information», Ibn Khaldūn (1967, p. 71) says that there are various reasons that make untruth afflict information. He then enumerates seven reasons that are difficult to avoid. These are:

1. *Partisanship for opinions and schools*. If the soul is infected with partisanship for a particular opinion or sect, it accepts without hesitation the information that is agreeable to it. Prejudice and partisanship obscure the critical faculty and hinder critical investigation.

2. *Reliance upon transmitters*. This belongs to «personality criticism», a theological methodology in Islam that concern criticism of the way transmitters interpret religious data.

3. *Unawareness of the purpose of an event*. Many does not know the real significance and intention behind the transmitted information and attributes to it the significance he assumes or imagines it to have.

4. *Unfounded assumptions as to the truth of a thing*. This is frequent. It results mostly from reliance upon transmitters imagining that what they transmit is trustworthy.

5. *Ignorance of how conditions conform to reality*. Conditions are affected by ambiguities and artificial distortions. The researcher reports the conditions, having no true picture of how these conditions apply to reality. Here lies lack of empiricism.

6. *Approaching great and high-ranking persons with praise and encomiums.* Researchers embellish conditions, spread them and make them known to many people. The information made public in such cases is not truthful.

«Human souls long for praise, and people pay great attention to this world and the positions and wealth it offers. As a rule, they feel no desire for virtue and have no special interest in virtuous people».

7. *Ignorance of the innate nature of the various conditions arising in social organization* [al-jahl bi ṭabā'iᶜ al-aḥwāl fi-l-ᶜumrān]. This reason for making untruth unavoidable is more powerful than all the reasons previously mentioned.

He says further that «Every event, or phenomenon, whether it comes into being in connection with some essence or as the result of an action, must inevitably possess a nature peculiar to its essence as well as to the accidental conditions that may attach themselves to it». This means again that if one knows the inner nature of events and conditions and their requirements in the real world, or in other words, if one knows why or on which ground things change, this will help in distinguishing truth from untruth when investigating information critically. This is more effective in critical investigation than any other aspect, for instance, the previously mentioned criticism of transmitters.

To understand something one has to consider the duality peculiar to the essence of a thing as well as to the accidental conditions that may attach themselves to it. In other words: the thing in itself and the thing in its context. The first is a definition of the innate characteristics of the thing and its form (Solidity, Extent, Type and Segment) (M. Al-Araki, 2013), a kind of detailed description of the thing conceived isolated. The second is a conception of the thing in its context where the dynamics of throughput or lines of action dominate.

Among the causes of falsehood enumerated above, Ibn Khaldūn considers ignorance of the various conditions arising in social organization [al-jahl bi ṭabā'iᶜ al-

aḥwāl fi-l-ᶜumrān] as the most dangerous one. Lack of empiricism, reason 5, and failure to interpret the surrounding socio-economic conditions and their impact on events and happenings in the real world, pave the way for this type of ignorance and for the destruction of social organization. People do not find an answer to why things are deteriorating. This happens often by the end of the dynasty when the elites are overwhelmed in a life of luxury and opulence, so that they do not perceive the consequences of what is happening in real life.

It is the fourth generation, the generation of opulence that destroys civilization. Corruption, taxation, injustice and economic decay are inflicted upon the inhabitants. The destruction starts by the centre.

Disintegration afflicts the fourth generation

In chapter III, «on dynasties, royal authority, the caliphate, government ranks and all that goes with these things…» section 12, dynasties have a natural life span like individuals; Ibn Khaldūn (1967, 345–346) says that as a rule a dynasty covers three generations.

The first generation lays the ground foundation of power. Members of this first generation share privation and glory with each other. Their social solidarity or group feeling is strong. People are brave and greatly feared.

The second generation moves closer to a sedentary culture. People go from privation to luxury. One man claims all the glory for himself. The earlier vigour and pride of group feeling are weakened. However, many of the old virtues still remain, because of direct personal contact with the first generation. People have a mixture of hope and illusion that the conditions of the first generation may come back.

The third generation has completely forgotten the first period and its toughness. People have lost the taste for fame and group feeling, because they are dominated by force. Luxury reaches its peak among them, due to a life of prosperity and ease. People become dependent on the dynasty. Group feeling disappears completely, and people forget to defend themselves and to press their claims. The ruler, then, needs brave people for support as clients and followers. They help the dynasty until God permits its destruction. In the course of these three generations, the dynasty grows senile and is worn out.

Therefore, it is in the fourth generation that (ancestral) prestige is destroyed.

Three generations last 120 years. As a rule, dynasties do not last longer than that, as long as no one attacks the dynasty. When senility becomes predominant, there may be no claimant for the dynasty, and no one repels attackers. When the time is up, the end cannot be postponed.

The life span of a dynasty corresponds to that of an individual: it grows up and passes into an age of stagnation and thence into retrogression. The rise and fall of civilizations have also to do with how knowledgeable people are regarding the socio-economic conditions that influence growth and development.

Growth and development require justice

In the *Book on Politics* that is ascribed to Aristotle and has wide circulation, we find (Ibn Khaldūn 1967, p. 81) a good deal about the subject under discussion here. In this book, the author referred to such general ideas as we have reported, on the authority of the Mobedhan and Anosharwan. He arranged his statement in a remarkable circle that he discussed at length. It runs as follows:

"The world is a garden the fence of which is the dynasty. The dynasty is an authority realized through the overall political guidelines. Political guidelines are a policy directed by the ruler. The ruler is an institution supported by the soldiers. The soldiers are helpers who are maintained by money. Money is sustenance brought together by the subjects. The subjects are servants who are protected by justice. Justice is something familiar, and through it, the world persists. The world is a garden …", and then it begins again from the beginning.

The circle below includes these words of wisdom. As we see the circle starts by the world, in general, and the state in particular. It is within the state that conditions of power, earning, artistry and knowledge should be studied.

Figure 1.1. The world as a garden.

Ibn Khaldūn did not explicitly define, in details and in one place in the Muqaddimah, what he means by justice. However the word justice (al-ᶜadl) occurs in many different contexts throughout the whole work.

Justice requires political leadership

In Chapter III, entitled «on dynasties, royal authority, the caliphate, government ranks and all that goes with these things», Ibn Khaldūn says in section 41, that «*injustice brings about the ruin of civilization*» (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, pp. 103–111). He further says that evil qualities in man are injustice and mutual aggression. There is therefore a need for an authority or a restraining power to hold people back from being unjust to one another. Injustice ruins civilizations, he says. One of the eight words of wisdom mentioned in the above circle of Secretum Secretorum reads «Justice is something familiar, and through it, the world persists»

Ibn Khaldūn means that the rise and fall of civilizations has to do with how justice is practiced in a society. In chapter III, Section 50, *Human civilization requires political leadership for its organization* (pp. 137–156), he postulates that lack of organised and efficient political leadership announces corruption and injustice.

I have tried to define the concept of justice indirectly from a letter that Ibn Khaldūn describes as the best and most comprehensive written document on the subject. This is the letter of Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn, al-Ma'mūn's general, to his son ᶜAbdallāh ibn Ṭāhir when al-Ma'mūn appointed him as governor of ar-Raqqah, Egypt, and the intervening territories.

I have abridged this letter and simplified its layout to make it understandable and to concentrate on justice from the part of the ruler towards his subjects and employees. Most of the translation is taken from Rosenthal and controlled against the

Arabic original of Quatremère, used in my translation to Norwegian (Ibn Khaldun & al-Araki, 2012). My abridgement follows a typology called PEAK that stands for Power, Earnings, Artistry and Knowledge, deduced from the writings of Ibn Khaldūn.

Power

- Do not be swayed from justice according to your likes and dislikes, either on behalf of a person close to you or on behalf of one remote from you. People will have respect for your rule and reverence for your government. They will be friendly to you and trust in your justice.

- Do not let your good opinion of the men around you and your kindness to your subjects prevent you from making inquiries, from investigating your affairs, from taking personal charge of the business of your officials, from protecting your subjects, or from looking after the things that sustain and benefit them. On the contrary, consider it your most important task to take personal charge of the affairs of your officials and to protect your subjects by looking after their needs and providing for their requirements.

- Do not postpone the punishment of those who must be punished. If you fall short in this respect, it will help spoil the good opinion people have of you.

- Beware of saying: "I am in authority. I may do what I want to do." This soon reveals a lack of sense on your part and little certainty of the one and only God.

- The change from favour to vengeance occurs nowhere faster than with men in authority who do not acknowledge favours, and with people enjoying good positions in the government, who are ungrateful and consider themselves superior beings.

- Making decisions and dispensing justice in judicial procedure and in all actions brings well-being to the subjects. The roads, then, are safe. The person who was treated unjustly finds justice. Everyone obtains his right. The livelihood of all is safeguarded. Proper obedience is paid. God gives good health and well-being.

- Abstain from corruption. Go and apply the legal punishments. Do not make haste. Stay away from anger and unrest. Be satisfied with an oath. Let your breath be calm and your cheek cool. Make use of your experience. Be attentive when you are silent, and precise when you speak. Treat the plaintiff fairly. Hesitate when there is a doubt. Have much evidence produced. Do not show prejudice in favour of any of your subjects. Do not give anyone preferred treatment. Do not expose yourself to censure. Be steadfast and slow. Observe. Look out. Reflect. Think things over. Consider them. Be humble in the presence of your Lord. Be kind to all your subjects. Let the truth govern you.

Earnings

- Be moderate in everything. There is nothing more clearly useful, safer, and in every way better, than moderation. Planned moderation calls for right guidance. Right guidance leads to success. Success leads to happiness. You should know that planned moderation in worldly matters gives strength and protects against sins. You have nothing that is better than moderation to guard your person and your rank and to try to improve your affairs. Therefore, use it and be guided by it. Then, your affairs will succeed. Your power will increase. Your private and public affairs will be in order.

- In all these things, have pure intentions. Pay special attention to improving yourself as a person, one who realizes that he will be held responsible for his

deeds, that he will be rewarded for his good deeds, and punished for his evil deeds.

- Do not be greedy. Let the treasures and riches you gather and hoard up be piety, the fear of God, justice, the improvement of your subjects, the cultivation of their country, the supervision of their affairs, the protection of the mass of them, and support of the unfortunates.

- You should know that property, once it is gathered and stored in treasuries, does not bear fruit, but if it is invested in the welfare of the subjects and used for giving them what is due to them and to prevent them from need, then it grows and thrives. The common people prosper. The proper use of money is an ornament to high officials, and it means a time of prosperity. It brings strength and protection.

- Give your subjects their share. Pay attention to the things that might improve their situation and livelihood. In this way, you will also be better able to levy the land tax and to collect the property of your subjects and your provinces. Because everybody experiences justice and kindness from you, everybody will be more amenable to obeying you and more favourably disposed towards everything you want. Therefore, exert yourself in the way that I have outlined to you in this chapter. Be very much concerned in this respect.

- Consider the land tax. It maintains the subjects. Therefore, distribute the land tax among those to whom it belongs, and do it justly, fairly, equitably, and generally. Do not make a noble man (*sharif*) pay less because of his nobility, or a rich man because of his wealth, or one of your secretaries, or one of your intimates and entourage. Do not ask for more than is tolerable. Do not charge anyone too much. Treat all the people justly. This makes it easier to gain their friendship and is more certain to achieve general satisfaction.

Artistry

- Do not suspect anyone who works for you with regard to the work with which you have entrusted him, before you have discovered what is the matter with him. For it is a crime to suspect innocent persons and to have a bad opinion of them. Therefore, make it your duty to have a good opinion of the men around you. Drive away bad opinions of them, and do not harbour any such opinions. That will help you to gain their following and to train them.

- You should know that having a good opinion of others gives you strength and rest, and you will be competent to handle your affairs to your satisfaction. It will enable you to cause people to love you and to be straightforward in everything.

- If you enter into an agreement, fulfil it. If you have promised to do a certain good deed, keep your promise. Accept favours and repay them. Close your eyes to the defects of those of your subjects who may have them. Refrain from lies and falsehoods. Despise liars and keep away calumniators. Your affairs will begin to fail, so far as their effects both in this world and the other world are concerned, as soon as you give access to a liar or boldly use lies yourself. Lying is the beginning of crimes and falsehood, and calumny their end. The calumniator is not safe himself. No friend of a man who listens to calumny is safe. Nothing works out well for a person who is governed by calumny.

- Love good and righteous people. Be honestly helpful to noble men. Be friendly to the weak. Keep in touch with your blood relatives.

- Keep away from evil desires and injustice. Pay them no notice and show your subjects that you are free of them. Be just in governing your subjects. Treat them honestly and with the kindness through which you will reach the path of right guidance.

- Control yourself and do not get angry. Prefer dignity and mildness. Beware of sharpness, levity, and deceitfulness in any enterprise you engage in.

- Acknowledge the gratefulness of those who express their thanks, and reward them for it.

- Do not consider any sin lightly. Do not support an envious person. Do not pity a sinner. Do not be friendly with an ungrateful person. Do not connive with an enemy. Do not trust a calumniator. Do not rely upon a deceiver. Do not conclude a friendship with an immoral person. Do not follow a seducer. Do not praise a hypocrite. Have contempt for nobody. Do not refuse a poor petitioner. Do not try to improve a worthless person. Pay no attention to buffoons. Do not break a promise. Do not fear pride. Show no anger. Do not be ostentatious. Do not walk arrogantly. Do not justify a stupidity. Do not neglect your search for the other world. Do not waste your days in finding fault. Do not close your eyes to an evildoer, because you are afraid of him or because you have a prejudice in his favour.

- Consult frequently with jurists. Accustom yourself to being mild and prudent. Learn from men of experience and intelligence who are understanding and wise. Do not permit extravagant or stingy people to give you advice. Do not listen to what they say, because the damage they can cause is greater than their usefulness. Nothing can ruin your projects on behalf of your subjects more quickly than avarice. You should realize that if you are greedy, you take much and give little. If you are this way, you will have little success, for your subjects will be willing to like you only if you keep away from their property and do not treat them unjustly. You will keep the sincere friendship of your friends by being generous to them and giving them fine gifts. Shun avarice.

- Appoint a trusted official in every district under your jurisdiction, to inform you about your officials and to write you concerning their manner of life and

activities. Thus, you will have eventually something like personal contact with every official in his area of jurisdiction and personally observe all his affairs.

- If you want to order your official to do something, consider what the result of the thing you want done will be. If you see that the result will be healthy and sound, and if you hope for a good return from it and good council and benefit, send your order out. If not, refrain from any immediate action and consult people of insight and knowledge about the matter. Then, prepare for action. A man often looks at something he wants to do and finds it to be as he desires. This pleases and deceives him. Failure to consider what the result may be, could be his ruin and destruction.

- Whatever you want to do, do it resolutely and address yourself to it forcefully. Finish the work you have to do today and do not postpone it until tomorrow. Do much of it yourself. For every tomorrow has its own business and events that will keep you from doing the work you should have done today but postponed. You should know that when a day is gone, it is gone with all there was in it. If you postponed the work that you should have done yesterday, you will have to do two days' work today. That will be difficult for you and will eventually make you ill. On the other hand, if you do each day the work that you should do, you will give rest to your body and soul and discharge your tasks as ruler well.

- Consider the free noble people who are advanced in age and of whose sincere intentions you can be certain, and whose love for you, whose helpfulness as advisers, whose active interest in your affairs you have observed. Select them for your service and be benevolent toward them.

Knowledge

- Be assured that generosity is one of the best things for a human being to practice. Make generosity one of your character qualities. [Be really generous.] Accept generosity as your constant practice.

- It is sufficient happiness for a man in authority that his soldiers and subjects find mercy in his justice, protection, fairness, attentiveness, kindness, piety, and largesse. Therefore, avoid the unpleasantness of one of the two alternatives by being conscious of the excellence of the other alternative and by always acting in accordance with it. Then, you will find success, well-being, and prosperity, if God wills.

- You should know that by your appointment, you were made treasurer, guardian, and shepherd. The people under your jurisdiction are called subjects (ra'iyah "flock"), because you are their shepherd and overseer. Therefore, accept from them what they give you of their affluence, and use it for the administration of their affairs, for their welfare, and for providing for their needs. Employ for them understanding, skilled, and experienced men, who have theoretical knowledge of, and are able to act with, political wisdom and moderation. Give them good salaries. This is one of the duties incumbent upon you in connection with the task with which you have been entrusted. Let nothing divert your attention or distract you from it. When you give preference to this matter and take charge of it properly, you will cause an increase in the favours your Lord bestows upon you, and favourable comment on your activities. You will also gain through it the love of your subjects and promote the general welfare. The general well-being of your country will be improved. Cultural activity will expand in your region. The fertility of your districts will be evident. Your income from the land tax will be large. Your property will be extensive.

You will have the attachment of your soldiers and be able to satisfy everybody through generous gifts from you. Your political leadership will be praised. Your justice will be approved by the enemy. In all your affairs, you will be just, capable in deed, powerful, and well equipped. Therefore, strive for this goal. Do not give anything else preference over it. Then, the results of your rule will find praise, if God wills.

- Have regard for the descendants of great houses who have become needy. Provide for their requirements and improve their condition, so that indigence will no longer be able to touch them.

- Devote yourself to looking after the affairs of the poor and indigent, those who are not able to bring before you complaints about injustices they have suffered, and other lowly persons who do not know that they may ask for their rights. Inquire about these people in all secrecy, and put good men from among your subjects in charge of them. Command them to report to you their needs and conditions, so that you will be able to look into the measures through which God might improve their affairs.

- Have regard also for people who have suffered accidents, and for their widows and orphans. Give them stipends from the treasury

- Give the blind stipends from the treasury.

- Set up houses for those who are ill, to shelter them. Appoint attendants in these houses who will handle them kindly, and appoint physicians who will treat their diseases. Comply with their desires so long as it does not lead to waste in the treasury.

- You should know that when people are given their rights and when their dearest wishes are fulfilled, they are still not satisfied and are not quiet, but want to bring their needs to the attention of those in charge of them, because they desire to receive more and to get additional kindnesses from them. Often,

the person who looks after the affairs of the people is annoyed by the great number of matters referred to him, which occupy his thought and mind, and cause him embarrassment and difficulties.

- Let people frequently come to see you and show them your face. Let not your guards hinder them. Be humble toward them. Show them your smiling countenance. Be lenient with them when you put questions and speak to them. Be benevolent to them in your generosity and bounty.

- If you give, do it kindly and pleasantly. Do it for the sake of doing a good deed and of receiving the reward for it in the other world. Do it without causing trouble, and do not remind the person to whom you give something of your gift in the expectation of a gift in return.

- Learn from the affairs of the world that you are able to observe personally, and from the persons in authority and in positions of leadership who lived before your time in past centuries and among nations that disappeared.

- Be acquainted with the property that your officials collect and use for their expenditures. Do not take any forbidden property, and do not be a wasteful spender.

- Sit down often with scholars and seek their advice and company.

- Consider those the most honourable of your protégés and intimates who, when they notice a fault in you, are not deterred by their respect for you from informing you about it in secret or from calling your attention to the shortcoming that lies in that fault. People of that sort are your most sincere friends and helpers.

- Look at those of your officials who are present at your residence, and at your secretaries. Appoint for each one of them a time of the day in which he may come to you with his documents and orders and also present to you the needs of your officials and the affairs of your districts and subjects with which he is

concerned. Lend your ear and your eye, your mind and your intellect, to the things of that sort which he presents to you. Go over it again and think it over. If it is reasonable and appears effective, order it to be done and ask God about it. If not, have it checked and investigated.

- Do not remind your subjects or anyone else to whom you show a favour, of it in the expectation of a gift. Accept from no one anything except faithfulness, straightforwardness, and support for the affairs of the Muslims. Do not do any favours for anyone except under these conditions.

Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn concludes his letter to his son by saying «understand this letter of mine that I am addressing to you. Study it carefully and always act in accordance with it». Commenting the letter, Ibn Khaldūn says that this is the best treatment of this type of politics that I have found.

Conclusion

I started this paper with how ignorance of socio-economic conditions affects growth and development in a society, afflicting the elites and the ordinary man alike. The decay of social solidarity and cohesion, especially during the fourth generation, afflicts development. After that opulence has dominated, and moderation disappeared as a virtue, the dynasty approaches its end in the fourth generation.

People favour partisanship, rely upon transmitters, become unaware of the purpose of an event, produce unfounded assumptions as to the truth of a thing, ignore how conditions conform with reality, approach high-ranking persons with praise and encomiums and eulogy and end by ignoring the innate nature of the various conditions arising in social organization. They neither differentiate, experiment, nor theorize about conditions they live under or observe. The well-known and famil-

iar concept of justice is not perceived as a solution. However, this justice requires a conscious and moderate political leadership as explained in the recommendations of Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn to his son.

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Chapter 2

Impact of Changes in Electoral System on Women's Parliamentary Representation in Latvia

Jānis Ikstens[1]

Owing to the burgeoning scholarly literature on gender and politics, it has become increasingly accepted that a more balanced representation of gender in decision making bodies matters in various ways. Increased women's presence in national legislatures is thought to strengthen a regime's legitimacy, to modify political the agenda, and to affect the actual decisions, just to name a few.

Proportional representation has been known as an electoral system that is more favorable for women's representation, particularly if operated along with large-magnitude electoral districts and gender quotas in candidate lists. It has been claimed that closed lists tend to provide safer pathways for women to elected positions. However, the effect of preferential voting remains underexplored.

Latvia provides an excellent case for studying the gender impact of preferential voting. Since the fall of Communism, the share of women parliamentarians has risen from 15% to 21%. All seven post-Communist parliamentary elections were held under an open-list PR system in five districts. However, an important modification of the electoral system occurred in 2010 stipulating that each candidate can run in only one of five electoral districts. It is this institutional modification that will be the focal point of this study.

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This article sets to explore how the 2010 reform affected the electability of women to the Latvian parliament. Is it the institutional changes that fostered women's representation in the Saeima? Do party families affect women's electability? Do new parties offer a better springboard for women candidates? What is the role of incumbency?

Electoral systems and gender representation

Women's participation in legislative bodies is increasingly seen as a significant factor contributing to the functioning of a political system in various ways. However, there are divergent explanations of how a higher female share of members of parliament (MP) is achieved.

An institutional theory emphasizes the role of electoral system. Rule and Zimmerman (1994) highlight the positive impact of a proportional system on women's representation at the parliamentary level. Further, a closed-list system is said to provide a safer way to the legislature as voters would not have any influence on which particular persons get elected from their preferred list.

A behavioral approach seems to concentrate around the supply-and-demand model of candidate selection (Krook, 2010). The presence of women in elected bodies partly is thought to stem from individual-level factors: a woman's willingness to run for office; her interest in political affairs; the availability of key resources to her (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). In a well-document study in USA, Lawless and Fox (2005) argue that the level of female political ambitions is lower and that stems from a long-standing pattern of socialization that emphasizes the role of woman in private rather than public life.

After an eligible candidate expresses her commitment to run for an office, Krook (2010) relates the candidate's fate to demand-side factors: attitudes of (male-dominated) political elite towards women's participation in political life and party elite perceptions of female candidates' potential contribution to election results. Niven (1998), Franceschet (2005) as well as Bauer and Britton (2006) provide geographically diverse arguments to substantiate the limiting role of political elites on women's representation.

If claims about the restrictive effect of male-dominated party elites are valid, this effect should be rendered insignificant under electoral systems that endow voters with a greater say about who is elected, namely, preferential systems of voting. Here, voters are free to express their attitudes towards each candidate and thus they are in a position to at least partly remedy injustice to female candidates. *Inter alia*, female candidates could obtain higher rankings after voter preferences are counted. Ryan et al (2010) in fact make a case that women could be more competitive than men.

In view of the key role of voters in the selection process under preferential systems, the supply-and-demand model could be modified for these cases. The supply side would then include women's aspirations and resources, on the one hand, and nomination decisions by party elites, on the other. So, the latter are expected to cater to the expectations of voters (demand side) in order to maximize a party's aggregate vote.

The present paper will focus on parts of the supply side, in particular, the pool of candidates, women's ratio and ranking as well as on the demand side by examining preferences voters expressed for particular candidates in order to identify sociological traits that may affect electability of an individual candidate beside gender.

If the above assumptions are correct, one would expect that female candidates get nominated less frequently in Latvia, but voters would correct this gender imbalance by expressing individual preferences for female candidates.

Electoral system of Latvia

Article 6 of *Satversme* stipulates that "the *Saeima* shall be elected in general, equal and direct elections, and by secret ballot based on proportional representation". The 1992 law on elections to the 5th *Saeima* was considerably more resolute as an electoral threshold of 4% of all votes was introduced. The threshold of 5% of votes has been applied since the 1995 elections. Although Latvia's parliamentary elections are held in five electoral districts and winners of seats are calculated separately for each district, the threshold has to be cleared nationally regardless of a candidate list's fortunes in a particular district.

As far as the submission of candidate lists is concerned, there existed a few qualifications before the founding elections in 1993 (payment of security deposit; endorsement of 100 adult citizens) but the law did not set any restrictions as to who submits the list – a political party, a group of parties, an NGO or merely a group of citizens. Beginning in 1995, only registered political parties or associations thereof were allowed to submit candidate lists for parliamentary elections.

The election law provided for the opportunity for voters to indicate their personal preferences by crossing out any number of candidates on their preferred slates (negative preference voting) or giving a "plus" to their favourites on the same slate (positive preference voting). This has caused modest intra-party competition and individual campaigning (Aylott et al. 2012). The use of preferential voting has expanded. In the 1993 elections, only 23% of ballots contained at least one preference indication. This share had grown to 64% in the 2010 elections.

In early 2009, the Saeima yielded to public pressure and amended the electoral legislation so that any candidate is allowed to run in only one electoral district. This move was seen by many voters as a triumph of justice and a restriction on the impact that celebrities or charismatic politicians have on voter behavior; its actual effects, especially on gender representation, remain to be explored as there exist no gender quotas for parliament or for candidate lists.

Regardless of institutional barriers, party composition of the Saeima has been notably fluid. Electoral volatility in Latvia has been well above an Eastern European average (Sikk 2005). The high turnover of political parties also triggered a turnover of elected politicians that could even supersede 50% around the turn of the century. Voter surveys have revealed a relentless taste for new politicians that is positively correlated with a more general dissatisfaction with economic conditions and the particular developmental path of Latvia.

Trends in gender representation

There is a notable gender gap in the population of Latvia, with women constituting 54.3% of residents (Statistikas gadagrāmata 2012). The difference is slightly smaller among the citizens of Latvia - women constitute 53.6% of the citizenry. However, these differences are far from being equally distributed in all age groups. On the contrary, the age group of 15-34 year-olds is dominated by men (51% : 49%) but a rough balance is only found between 35 and 39 years of age. Women clearly outnumber men in older age groups. This structure of gender imbalance is of particular importance in light of voter behavior. Post-election surveys have repeatedly found a positive correlation between age and turnout in parliamentary elections in Latvia.

Analysis of official electoral records shows that the percentage of female candidates has risen over the years as has the share of female members of parliament.

Yet, the gap between women nominated for the election and women actually elected to the parliament has largely remained unchanged at about 10 percentage points.

Figure 2.1. Share of women among parliamentary candidates and MPs, 1998-2011.

Source: Central Elections Commission of Latvia

However, Figure 2.1 also illustrates that the success rate of female candidates has seen a less stellar trend revolving around 6 percent of total female candidate number. One may note a drop in the success rate of female candidates in the 2010 elections when, for the first time, each candidate was allowed to run in one electoral district only. This occurred against the background of an increase in the total number of candidates and a higher share of female candidates, which may be an indication that the female candidates that landed on the expanded party lists were less competi-

tive. This tentative finding should be corroborated against results of next regular parliamentary elections[2].

The aggregate figures do not provide a complete picture of party strategies for the period up to the 2006 elections (including). As the same person could run in several electoral districts simultaneously, the aggregate figures downplayed an increasing male dominance since 1998. One can see in all five districts a clear trend towards a smaller share of female candidates. That means that male candidates were increasingly running in several districts more often than female candidates. The trend towards increased share of male candidates was broken in the 2010 elections that saw a notable female rebound both in terms of candidate share and the percentage of elected MPs. However, an increasing male dominance at the district level did not result in higher percentage of male MPs. On the contrary, the share of female MPs has steadily been growing at the national level.

Another aspect of party strategies is a tendency to increase the share of female candidates in larger electoral districts (correlation of 0.38), which generally supports findings about the logic behind construction of a candidate list in a multi-member district. Yet, female candidates fare considerably better in smaller districts (correlation of -0.42). This rather unexpected result can be seen as a reflection of party strategy to field their strongest candidates in larger districts where the number of voters to be mobilized is higher. For example, the average success rate of female candidates in the Rīga electoral district—housing nearly a third of all seats—was a mere 2.9 per cent. In the Kurzeme district that is half the size of Rīga, the average success rate of

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[2] Aylott et al. (2012) found that a number of incumbent parties for the 2011 extraordinary elections chose to field their 2010 lists with some modifications by removing candidates who were regarded as underperformers.

female candidates amounted to 7.6 per cent. Kurzeme is the only district where the average success rate of male candidates is lower than that of female candidates.

So far, the gender representation has been treated without paying due attention to particular political parties, simplistically assuming that all parties would follow the same logic based on institutional considerations only. A closer look at cross-party patterns provides further insights into female candidacy.

Regardless of institutional setting, parties that clear the 5 per cent threshold tend, on average, to field lists with a lower female candidate share. This pattern has held for four elections out of five under scrutiny in this article, and it may signal that resorting to more gender-balanced candidate lists may undermine a party's electoral fortunes rather than make a party more appealing to the voting population where women hold a majority.

Figure 2.2. Female share of candidates by party, 1998-2011

Given the high turnover of political parties in the parliament following each election, one may wonder if political newcomers attempt to replicate the behavior of

incumbent parties that, in view of the above finding, would be less interested in gender balanced list, or they challenge the existing order by including more of both non-incumbents and female candidates in their lists. The general pattern is mixed as three elections saw newcomers submitting lists with a higher share of female candidates, while in two elections their lists contributed to an even greater gender imbalance.

A further distinction between parties could be made on the basis of party families. While it would be ideal to include in the analysis all parties that contested elections, this is not feasible due to a lack of reliable classification of those Latvian parties that have never been elected to the parliament. Other parties are classified in part by Rose and Munro (2009) and in part by the author of the present paper on the basis of scheme by Rose and Munro. In order to minimize randomness of results, only those party families that had at least three successful representatives since 1998 have been included in calculations.

Table 2.1. Average share of female candidates by party family, 1998-2011.	
Party family	Percentage
Nationalist Latvian	19,7
Conservative	21,7
Nationalist Slavic	21,7
Agrarian parties	22,2
Liberal	33,8

The analysis shows that most party families demonstrate an average of 20 per cent of female candidates. Liberal parties constitute the only exception as their average share of female candidates stands at 34 per cent. Two caveats apply, however. Greens have had a joint list with an agrarian party and the stronghold of this joint venture (Union of Greens and Farmers) is in the rural areas. Assuming that Greens represent post-materialistic politics of sorts, they still have not been able to increase their share of female candidates beyond a national average of electorally successful

parties. Second, parties claiming to represent interests of two major linguistic communities demonstrate similar female candidate ratios. Yet, some Russophone parties have at times been classified as Social Democratic parties (see Rose and Munro 2003). However inaccurate this classification could be, those parties would not meet expectations of higher female candidate ratio.

Effects of gender

A further elaboration of gender representation will be made by using a data set of candidates for the 2006 elections and the 2010 elections. The two elections were chosen because of institutional change in 2009 when amendments to the Saeima Elections Law narrowed each candidate's choice to running in one electoral district only. Further, the performance of only those parties or party alliances will be analyzed that cleared the 5 per cent electoral threshold and gained parliamentary representation in the particular elections.

As the average share of female candidates has varied only slightly across the five electoral districts in elections since 1998, it was assumed that parties had not detected any district-specific patterns of voter behavior that would prompt them to configure the gender ratio in their lists to better cater to the needs of potential supporters. It was also assumed that parties tend to place the strongest candidates at the top of the candidate list and that this assumption is known to voters either from campaign communication or from experience of previous elections. In view of varied district size, simple rank order numbers of candidates cannot be used for regression analysis. Therefore, each candidate was assigned a place in quintiles and this five-point variable was used for linear regression. Independent variables included in the regression model were the age of each candidate, gender, level of formal education, parliamentary incumbency (whether a candidate was a member of parliament or a

cabinet minister at the time of elections), municipal incumbency (whether a candidate was an elected member of municipal council) as well as ethnicity (as defined by candidate). Results of the regression analysis are reported in Appendices 2.1 and 2.2.

In 2006, the specified regression model explained between 20 and 28 per cent of the variance of candidate placement of four parties in a statistically significant way. For three other parties that cleared the electoral threshold, the explained variance was below 10 per cent and the results were not statistically significant. Parliamentary incumbency emerges as the most important factor determining a higher candidate placement on the list, which broadly confirms expectations. For the People's Party, the LPP/LC party and "For Human Rights in United Latvia", incumbency has played a negative role but the result was not statistically significant. However, the negative sign of the coefficient can be derived from developments within those parties. LPP merged with "Latvia's Way" (LC) a year earlier and nominated many former LC representatives who, by definition, were outside the Saeima or the cabinet. The People's Party attempted to bring in a new generation of politicians who had been on the sidelines of parliamentary politics but did not serve as elected officials. "For Human Rights in United Latvia" (FHRUL) suffered from a split in 2003 and many of MPs elected from that list switched to "Harmony Centre" (HC), which explains not only a lack of incumbents on the FHRUL list but also a wealth of incumbents on the HC list. Yet, municipal incumbency has fared strongly in both FHRUL and HC. Age appears to have played a miniscule role.

For all but one list, being a female has a positive effect on top placement. This is a surprising finding given the generally lower success rate of female candidates at the polls. One may want to note, however, that statistical significance of those coefficients is low. Further, there is another interesting finding – parties associated with

advocacy of ethnic Latvian interests tend to have small gender coefficients than Russophone parties do.

For 2010, the same regression model explained between 17 and 24 per cent of variance in candidate placement within list of four parties in a statistically significant way. Like in 2006, parliamentary incumbency played the most significant role while age had a minimal role. Contrary to the previous elections, education emerged as important factor, particularly among ethnic Latvian parties.

The role of gender had become more pronounced as the regression coefficients signal. However, in three out of five cases under scrutiny being a female appears to undermine a candidate's chances to a higher placement. This trend is particularly strong for the National Alliance that was set up by a political dinosaur (For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK) and an ambitious newcomer (All for Latvia!). The latter drew support from among the youth; therefore, an expectation that it would be more open to female candidates proved wrong.

Considering the 2009 changes in the electoral system, one may draw a conclusion that the new opportunities for more equal representation of gender on candidate lists remained largely idle. While the total number of candidates of each successful party nearly doubled (from 55-65 in 2006 to 115 in 2010), male candidates tended to be ranked higher by political parties.

Regardless of candidate rankings by parties, voters have powerful opportunities to express their preferences and attitude towards individual candidates on the list of their choice. Each voter may not only indicate a positive preference for a candidate but also express a negation of another candidate by crossing out his/her name on the ballot. This system has at times caused embarrassing upsets for leading fig-

ures of some political organizations. Therefore, it is important to consider the effects of gender on voter choice under this preferential system.

In order to assess the impact of select demographic characteristics, the above candidate databases from the 2006 elections and from the 2010 elections will be complemented with information about the electoral fortunes of each candidate running on a party list that cleared the electoral threshold nationally. Each candidate will then be assigned a "percentage of success" value that is calculated as a difference between positive and negative preferences for the respective candidate expressed as a percentage of votes cast for the respective list in the given electoral district. Absolute numbers of preferences are not feasible for intra-party calculations because electoral districts and the number of voters vary in size. It is assumed that supporters of a particular party in a given election have similar propensities to support a particular candidate profile across all five districts. It is also assumed that voters do not choose a particular party because of gender balance of its candidate list but for different reasons.

Descriptive statistics show a rather mixed situation. In order to account for candidate assessment in relation to gender, two gender compositions were compared for each party in each election – that of a complete candidate set in all five districts and that of candidates that received an aggregate positive preference, i.e. their positive preferences outweighed their negative preferences. In 2006, there were two parties where the female share in the aggregate positive preference group was larger than in the total of a party's candidates; two parties with an unchanged ratio (all candidates received aggregate positive preferences; both parties claimed to advocate Russophone interests), but three parties had a lower aggregate positive preference share. In 2010, there was only one party with a higher aggregate positive preference share, one with an unchanged ratio and three parties with a lower aggregate positive

preference share. This not only reveals the breadth of voter preferences but also provides additional arguments in favor of the hypothesis that additional opportunities for representation remained idle.

One may note certain voter behavior consistency over the two elections. Supporters of both the People's Party and LPP/LC downgraded female positions in 2006. When the two presented a joint list in 2010, the female share among aggregate positive preference group was lower again. Supporters of the Union of Greens and Farmers tended to express rather negative preferences for female candidates both in 2006 and in 2010. The liberally-minded "New Era" voters gave higher marks to female candidates in 2006 and so did supporters of the Unity bloc that was formed largely by "New Era" politicians. "Harmony Centre" voters kept giving positive preferences to all candidates both in 2006 and in 2010.

However, it may happen that other factors affected voter preferences and that gender alone did not preclude one from rocketing to the top of the candidate list after all ballots were counted. In order to probe into these effects, a linear regression model was used to estimate the impact of age, gender, education, ethnicity, incumbency and initial placement on aggregate positive preferences. The operationalization of most variables has been described above, and the placement quintiles were used for standardizing the initial placement. Regression analysis was carried out for each party separately using candidate data from all five districts. It was assumed that voters chose their preferred list for other reasons but the gender composition of the list in their district. Regression results are reported in Appendices 2.3 and 2.4.

Regression analysis demonstrates that the above model has a reasonable explanatory power of voter choices both in terms of the explained variation and statistical significance. Parliamentary incumbency had the highest impact in the 2006 data

set. Municipal incumbency had lower coefficients and also lacked statistical significance. The new variable of initial candidate placement on party list had as strong an effect and it had statistical significance in most cases. Ethnicity largely had the predicted effect (ethnic Latvians tend to prefer ethnic Latvians while non-Latvians prefer non-Latvians) but lacked statistical significance. The age factor appears minimal but being female apparently was not an asset in the eyes of voters. "New Era" constituted the only (and significant) exception to this trend.

In 2010 the above trends could be traced again, attesting to similar patterns of voter behavior. Parliamentary incumbency possessed the highest impact, even for the National Alliance whose supporters rather demonstrated distaste for incumbents. This can be explained in terms of rather tense intra-party relations and the process of establishing this political organization. The initial placement of candidates also played a significant role for nearly all parties/alliances. Municipal incumbency deserved attention as well. Like in 2006, there was a notable negative effect of gender upon positive voter preferences. Other factors appeared of lesser importance.

The above analysis indicates that supporters of winning parties tend to place a premium on elected-official experience of persons running for the parliament. Factors such as age or education figure less prominently. In the final analysis, being a female candidate tends to undermine one's chances of increasing one's aggregate positive preference. An interpretation of this finding appears to be related to views on social roles of each sex. It has been noted that the world of politics is regarded by a majority as a male realm[3].

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[3] Unpublished results from a survey of 1006 adult citizens commissioned by the University of Latvia in 2010 under the auspices of national research program „National Identity".

What is somewhat striking is the statistical weight of candidate placement, i.e. the higher a candidate is placed, the more likely s/he is to receive positive preferences. It could be flattering to attribute this trend to the ability of voters to take cues from the initial rank order of candidates. While such an interpretation cannot be ruled out completely it runs counter to findings by Aylott et al (2012). Major parties tend to select top candidates for parliamentary elections rather carefully, and they utilize public opinion surveys to separate the wheat from the chaff and to determine the district in which a particular candidate would be fielded.

Conclusions

A point of departure for this paper was an obvious disparity between a quantitative domination of women among the citizens of Latvia, on the one hand, and a mediocre female representation at the parliamentary level. Although Latvia may be slightly above a global average of women members of parliament standing at 18.3 per cent in 2008 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008), Latvian voters who actually cast a valid ballot are predominantly female.

Looking at this discrepancy from a modified supply-demand perspective, one can discern a number of reasons for the female under-representation. First of all, women may be less likely to step forward to enter politics for a variety of reasons. If ventured into politics, women may be perceived by decision makers within parties to be less suited for political activities. If women clear the perceptual threshold, they may be rejected by voters. This paper looked at the latter two phases of the supply-demand model in an attempt to identify some of the factors that help explain women's under-representation in the Latvian parliament. Particularly close attention was paid to the last two regular elections as they were held under somewhat different rules, and that would aid with institutional explanations.

Overall, there has been a three-to-one domination of men among all parliamentary candidates. Moreover, there was a trend of increased male presence that, however, was broken in 2010 as the new rules required more candidates to be placed on party lists. The gender imbalance varied across electoral districts. Official records showed that women were more frequently nominated in larger districts, which largely confirmed author's expectations in line with established literature on the effect of proportional representation on gender representation. What was unexpected was the fact that women fared better in smaller districts, which may be related to electoral strategy of parties to field more appealing candidates in larger districts. This requires further research on candidate recruitment strategies.

Trying to differentiate among parties, one finds that parties that clear the electoral threshold tend to include fewer women in their lists. Differences among party families, however, are more difficult to discern and a more pronounced trend is for liberal parties to have a higher share of female candidates.

Another indication of perceptual particularities is the initial placement of female candidates on a rank-ordered candidate list. Regression analysis demonstrated that parliamentary incumbency was the most important for initial placement. Gender played a neutral to negative role. Institutional changes rather led to an increased top positioning of male candidates.

An advantage of preferential voting is the ability of voters to re-rank-order candidates and thereby to have a decisive say on who gets elected. Viewed from this standpoint, the initial ranking may be of lesser importance and attention should be focused on the electoral booth where the final rank-order is produced. Here, however, female candidates more often obtain fewer aggregate positive preferences than male candidates do. Although parliamentary incumbency has a higher impact on

voter preferences, gender seems to be at play as well and it is not to the advantage of female candidates. Overall, the 2009 institutional changes cannot be considered benevolent for women's representation.

In view of findings from a study of candidate selection process, one may want to explore reasons for the relative downgrading of female candidates by Latvian voters to have a fuller understanding of factors behind women's underrepresentation in parliamentary politics.

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Appendix 2.1. Linear regression of candidate placement, 2006.

	Harmony Centre	For Human Rights in United Latvia	Union of Greens and Farmers	LPP/LC	People's Party	New Era	For Fatherland and Freedom
Female	.765 (.163)	.718 (.037)	.289 (.430)	-.467 (.170)	.060 (.877)	.073 (.808)	.066 (.855)
Age	.028 (.048)	.000 (.989)	.003 (.816)	-.007 (.629)	-.003 (.843)	-.009 (.520)	.004 (.729)
Latvian	-.936 (.088)	1.166 (.078)	.352 (.716)	-1.532 (.157)	1.097 (.466)	1.449 (.287)	.086 (.936)
Education	-.123 (.652)	.119 (.639)	.798 (.029)	.201 (.554)	.543 (.475)	.012 (.973)	-.474 (.754)
Saeima incumbency	1.307 (.002)	-.145 (.710)	1.232 (.002)	-.215 (.563)	-.168 (.631)	1.229 (.000)	.905 (.028)
Municipal incumbency	1.001 (.019)	.961 (.011)	.251 (.555)	-.807 (.186)	-.854 (.114)	-.054 (.891)	.603 (.131)
R^2	.256	.283	.207	.091	.040	.218	.067
Sig.	.003	.005	.003	.335	.736	.002	.384

Note: Unstandardized beta coefficients reported with significance test in brackets.

Appendix 2.2. Linear regression of candidate placement, 2010.

	Unity	Harmony Centre	Union of Greens and Farmers	For Good Latvia	National Alliance
Female	.250 (.335)	-.435 (.729)	.148 (.606)	-.301 (.379)	-.636 (.049)
Age	.003 (.732)	-.019 (.159)	-.008 (.509)	-.002 (.889)	.009 (.328)
Latvian	-.558 (.479)	-1.437 (.049)	1.119 (.408)	.137 (.850)	.452 (.746)
Education	.643 (.028)	-.027 (.914)	.336 (.271)	.619 (.028)	.483 (.0.28)
Saeima incumbency	1.149 (.000)	1.847 (.000)	1.468 (.000)	.490 (.174)	2.041 (.002)
Municipal incumbency	-.033 (.916)	.103 (.772)	.214 (.479)	-.159 (.654)	.215 (.516)
R^2	.191	.237	.213	.111	.165
Sig.	.001	.005	.001	.110	.003

Note: Unstandardized beta coefficients reported with significance test in brackets.

Appendix 2.3. Linear regression of aggregate positive preference, 2006.

	Harmony Centre	For Human Rights in United Latvia	Union of Greens and Farmers	LPP/LC	People's Party	New Era	For Fatherland and Freedom
Female	-1,141 (.639)	-2,381 (0.57)	-2,439 (.033)	-2,301 (.242)	-2,050 (.298)	7,301 (.001)	0,664 (.433)
Age	-.055 (.391)	0,051 (.327)	-0,051 (.215)	-0,115 (.168)	-0,052 (.510)	-0,027 (.762)	0,032 (.283)
Latvian	-1,958 (.423)	-1,581 (.502)	3,193 (.381)	-2,731 (.661)	6,496 (.396)	1,677 (.857)	1,585 (.530)
Education	-0,971 (.419)	-1,682 (.062)	1,217 (.290)	-3,503 (.074)	3,305 (.392)	3,194 (.198)	0,940 (.792)
Saeima incumbency	2,983 (.130)	7,691 (.000)	-0,544 (.660)	6,941 (.002)	-3,497 (.051)	-0,374 (.877)	12,421 (.000)
Municipal incumbency	2,779 (.150)	-0,508 (.709)	-2,517 (.058)	0,233 (.947)	-3,619 (.191)	-3,162 (.239)	1,484 (.120)
Low placement	-2,320 (.000)	-2,404 (.000)	-0,854 (.014)	-4,073 (.000)	-3,391 (.000)	-3,926 (.000)	-0,293 (.243)
R^2	.389	.649	.193	.444	.384	.425	.725
Sig.	.000	.000	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000

Note: Unstandardized beta coefficients reported with significance test in brackets.

Appendix 2.4. Linear regression of aggregate positive preference, 2010.

	Unity	Harmony Centre	Union of Greens and Farmers	For Good Latvia	National Alliance
Female	-1,401 (.388)	-0,280 (.895)	-1,522 (.156)	-1,064 (.462)	-0,257 (.889)
Age	0,021 (.737)	0,009 (.868)	-0,064 (.160)	-0,028 (.575)	-0,043 (.402)
Latvian	0,032 (.995)	0,665 (.836)	0,605 (.905)	3,508 (.254)	3,993 (.612)
Education	0,634 (.733)	3,318 (.003)	0,877 (.444)	0,313 (.791)	0,441 (.726)
Saeima incumbency	5,372 (.013)	16,047 (.000)	5,834 (.000)	2,468 (.108)	-8,840 (.020)
Municipal incumbency	-1,003 (.608)	2,427 (.118)	0,207 (.854)	0,929 (.535)	-2,325 (.214)
Low placement	-2,646 (.000)	-1,100 (.034)	-0,409 (.268)	-2,283 (.000)	-2,057 (.000)
R^2	.302	.572	.239	.304	.167
Sig.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007

Note: Unstandardized beta coefficients reported with significance test in brackets.

Chapter 3

Human Rights-Based Approach on Integration and Diversity

Julia Köhler-Olsen[1]

This article aims to illustrate how the human rights-based approach contributes to ensure that governmental policies and programs targeted at integration and diversity of individuals and groups into society at large, are sensitive to the human rights of the individual and group members. This aim asks for definitions of the terms "integration" and "diversity". The understanding of the terms "integration" and "diversity" can differ from author to author, individual to individual, and from one group of people to another group of people. I understand integration as the individual's experience of being a citizen with a voice that is heard by society. This implies that various characteristics, features or social divisions linked to the individual do not hinder his or her voice to be heard. In addition, group norms hindering his or her participation in public life, are norms which society is addressing. Thus, societies and governments need to contribute to a lasting change of discriminatory internal group norms otherwise integration is not evolving. Diversity in society is here understood as the states' and societies' obligation to ensure that group membership is a positive experience for members of the group. Every individual is linked to one or several groups within the larger society. Diversity is then not only the experience of diverse

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groups being integrated in society, but also the individual being integrated in society, despite all the various groups he or she might belong to, or might not belong to. Also, the experience of being able to choose one's way of life without an overwhelming interference by the group he or she is a member of is included in my understanding of the term diversity. Diversity within a minority or majority group is therefore part of my understanding of the term «diversity» in relation to this article.

The human-rights based approach

The human rights-based approach has its roots back to the 1980's and the global women's rights movement with one of its peaks being the United Nations Fourth Conference on Women's Rights in Beijing in 1995 where one important outcome was the statement that «Women's rights are human rights».[2] What the international women's rights movement did by stating this sentence was to take ownership of human rights, which until then often were perceived as rights only belonging to the white middle-class man. The women's movement had experienced that by formulating their demands for justice using human rights language, women got heard, and women experienced integrity and worth, rather than being victims that need help.

The human rights-based approach has developed into a conceptual framework for various processes or policies that are put into place in societies. Some of these processes or policies might deal with the development of society. Others concern the best possible care for individuals with certain needs of assistance within a welfare state system. Others again pertain to the state making efforts to implement

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[2] Beijing Declaration and Programme of Action. UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20. Mission statement (1995), para. 2.

policies and processes that are targeted at the integration of various ethnic or religious groups into society and at the same time allowing for diversity within society at large.

The human rights-based approach is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed at promoting and protecting human rights. The approach is conceived as a framework about empowering people to know and claim their rights, while increasing the ability and accountability of individuals and institutions that are responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling rights.[3]

The human rights-based approach has furthermore the ambition to operationalize human rights norms by giving a concrete meaning to the various human rights norms in the lives of all human beings. The approach is not only about "doing human rights," but concerns also the support and shape of the content of discourses about societal topics, such as integration and diversity.[4] Within these various discourses the human rights-based approach provides individuals with a voice that enables the fulfillment of their rights rather than just having the voice of a supplicant. The author Maria Suarez Toro put this notion in such words:

> *"We have been able to trace back and re-examine those situations that have characterized the denial of basic human rights in our lives, and this process has contributed to the rebuilding of personhood and the gaining of a sense of empower-*

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[3] Charlesworth, H. and Christine Chinkin, *The boundaries of international law - A feminist analysis* (2000), page 210 and 211.

[4] Brautigam, C. A., Mainstreaming Gender Perspective in the Work of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, page 390.

ment…This work has been instrumental in allowing us to move beyond the limiting portrayals of women-as-victims."[5]

Though the citation is from 1995, I think that it is nevertheless relevant for illustrating what is meant when human rights-based approach is considered to be a conceptual framework that "gives a voice" to individuals and enhances their sense of empowerment.

In addition, the citation allows the reader to replace the subject of concern. In the above wording the author points out that the human rights-based approach has been instrumental in allowing those using the human rights language to move beyond the limiting portrayals of *women-as-victims*. This subject of concern, women-as-victims, can, for example, be replaced by "to move beyond the limiting portrayals of *Roma people*" or "to move beyond the limiting portrayals of *elderly people* as being no longer part of everyday life in society." The subject of concern, which the human rights-based approach is concerned with, is thus changeable.

Furthermore, the human rights-based approach can be described as a conceptual framework that demands all characteristics, features or social divisions that frame and define an individual's life to be taken on board. This means that the human rights-based approach is not to be understood as a concept that presents society, its institutions, and individuals with a final solution to the balancing of conflicting human rights norms. Thus, social and legal conflicts due to a society consisting of various groups with different religious and cultural norms or with various opinions on how to live a good life cannot be solved once and for all by a human rights-based

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[5] Toro, M. S., Popularizing Women's Human Rights at the Local Level: A Grassroots Methodology for Setting the International Agenda (1995), page 191.

approach. What the human rights-based approach can provide us with is awareness; awareness with regard to discourses on integration and diversity locally, regionally and globally. The human rights-based approach reveals and illuminates if these discourses exclude or include variables, features or social divisions which we have to take into account when balancing various individuals' or groups' interests with each other.

Following the human rights-based approach in the design and implementation of policies, the human rights of each of one of us are articulated, considered, and balanced with each other and are therefore an integrate part in any policy making and policy implementation. Briefly, one can say that the use of a human rights entry point brings the entire human rights structure to bear.[6]

The approach does so, because it has certain underlying principles which are of fundamental importance when applied in practice. These fundamental principles are *participation*, *accountability*, *non-discrimination*, *equality*, *empowerment* and *legality*.[7] In order to make sure that every individual's or group's voice is heard in a process which is supposed to lead to integration, yet at the same time acknowledges and respects diversity, the human rights-based approach and its underlying principles are important tools that ought to be applied. Diverse individuals and groups must *participate* in discourses about the balancing of various norms. They must experience *non-discrimination* and *equality* during the discourse and after the balancing test of norms is completed. Additionally, the experience of *empowerment* is only attended to if par-

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[6] Report of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/21 (1998).

[7] http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/ourresources/promotinghrba, downloaded17.3.2014.

ticipation is in place. The duty-bearers in society then must be accountable for ensuring an open discourse and likewise an open balancing test, which leads to reconciling norms that can be considered to be in line with human rights norms. By realizing these fundamental principles, policy makers attend to the principle of *legality*.

It might seem strange to write about human rights not only as legal norms, but also as norms, which can have a very concrete and empowering meaning in the lives of all individuals, providing them with powerful arguments. Yet, the human rights-based approach contains three main features. First, the human rights-based approach concerns shaping the content and form of discourse in society and providing individuals with a voice that demands rights and interests fulfilled rather than asking for help. Second, the human rights-based approach deals with the obligation of state actors to actively ensure the experience of human rights for all citizens when designing and implementing policies. Third, the state has the duty to establish a meaningful, understandable, and reasonable legal justice system in order for the individual to have access to justice and to provide an answer to the question of whether the state actor has acted contrary to the individual human rights and thus violated those rights.

In the following, I will emphasize the second feature regarding the state's obligation to design and implement policies that actively ensure the experience of human rights for all citizens regardless of their status linked to various characteristics, features or social divisions.

The state's obligations according to the human-rights based approach

Many states have signed and ratified a variety of human rights conventions, which cover a variety of human rights and interests. Critics of the human rights systems emphasize that states are legally and politically bound by too many human rights conventions. There are not only international human rights conventions ratified by the UN general assembly, but there are also regional human rights conventions like the European Convention on Human Rights with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as its supervisory body, and the European Social Charter supervised by the European Committee of Social Rights.

The critique might be partly justified since it is rather challenging to relate to a large amount of legal sources and there is the possibility of "legal shopping" meaning that we shop from the law which suits our arguments best. However, the very important upside of the variety of legal human rights sources is that as a whole and non-hierarchic system this large amount of human rights sources might cover the various characteristics, features or social divisions that shape the life of each individual. Human rights law that, for example, addresses the rights of disabled people is relevant in considering whether the right to education for all citizens, laid down in the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is really in place for all citizens in a state, including the disabled citizen.

One human right interconnects to various other human rights. One right must be fulfilled in order to be able to experience and exercise another human right and vice-versa. One can say that human rights are all dependent and interconnected. Likewise, characteristics, features, and social divisions, which an individual belongs to, are dependent and interconnected. We define ourselves or are defined by others

through a number of characteristics, features, and social divisions such as gender, race, age, economic status, literacy or illiteracy, cultural norms, religious norms, and other forms of characteristics, features, or social divisions. Kimberlé Crenshaw has termed the interaction of these social divisions as "intersectionality".[8] According to the perspective of "intersectionality" gender, for example, does not include one social position, but many and focuses on the interaction between various power structures.[9] An intersectional perspective examines the context in which the definition of groups and the separation into different (and unequal) categories become meaningful and a basis for the exercise of power.[10] The Committee on the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) explains "intersectionality" with the term of "multiple discrimination" in its General Recommendation no. 25:

> *"Certain groups of women, in addition to suffering from discrimination directed at*
> *them as women, may also suffer from* <u>*multiple forms of discrimination*</u> *based on addi-*

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[8] Crenshaw, K., Demarignalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctring, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policy (1989), page 140. Crenshaw, K., Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Idenity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, (1991).

[9] Nilsson, E., Maritha Jacobsen and Lena Wenneberg, Children and Child Law at Crossroads: Intersectionality, Interdisciplinary and Intertextuality as Analytical Tools for Legal Research, (2014), page 35.

[10] Ibid., page 35

tional grounds such as race, ethnic or religious identity, disability, age, class caste or other factors."[11]

This has also been recognized by the UN Human Rights Committee, the supervisory body of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stating in its General comment no. 28 on equality of rights between men and women:

"Discrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination on other grounds such as race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. States parties should address the ways in which any instances of discrimination on other grounds affect women in a particular way, and include information on the measures taken to counter these effects."[12]

The human rights-based approach imposes on the state's policy makers to reveal these power structures by using the language of human rights. As a starting point, the right to non-discrimination based on one or several social divisions, in legal terms referred to as *discrimination grounds*, helps policy makers to analyze and define where discrimination against individuals based on one or several of these social divisions, threatens integration and diversity. The human right to non-discrimination based on various social divisions and discrimination grounds unfolds intersectionality, and thereby power structures that often are hidden at first sight.

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[11] General recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures, (2004), para.12

[12] General comment no. 28, CCPR, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, (2000), para. 30.

Human rights are non-hierarchic and indivisible. As such, they can provide a tool to address the challenge that policy-making faces in trying actively to change the situation of individuals. The challenges state actors face, are policies that do not work. The implementation of a human right by a government policy might fail because the policy was insensitive to the fact that individuals experience discrimination on multiple grounds. Discrimination can happen as soon as the policy is not taking into account all characteristics, features and social divisions that shape the life of the individual.

An example, where a state lacked awareness with regard to social divisions that shaped the lives of individuals that a state policy was targeted at, is a legal case of 2010 ruled by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. The case is titled "Orsus and Others vs. Croatia" and regards the placement of Roma children in Roma-only classes owing to their allegedly poor command of the Croatian language.[13] The applicants alleged racial discrimination and the violation of their right to education, in that the Roma-only curriculum was significantly reduced in volume and content compared to the official national curriculum. The Government had maintained that the applicants had only been put in separate classes on account of their inadequate command of the Croatian language.

The Grand Chamber of European Court of Human Rights ruled against the state of Croatia. The court emphasized that positive measures towards children who lacked adequate command of the language of instruction was not automatically contrary to the right to non-discrimination in connection with the right to education.

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[13] Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 15766/03, (2010).

However, the state's well-intended policy was implemented poorly by disregarding the child's right to a quality of education equal to all children's education regardless of school or the child's own background. The state did not adopt appropriate positive measures with a view to assist the applicants in acquiring the necessary language skills in the shortest time possible, notably by means of special language lessons. Additionally, there was no established program for addressing the special needs of Roma children with insufficient command of Croatian that would include a time-frame for the various phases of their acquisition of the necessary language skills. The court further pointed out that the high drop-out rate of Roma pupils in the area called for the implementation of further positive measures and the active involvement of social services in order to raise awareness of the importance of education among the Roma population. The state had not shown sufficient consideration for the special needs of Roma children as members of a disadvantaged group. As a result, the applicants had been placed in separate classes where an adapted curriculum was followed, yet without any clear or transparent criteria as regards their transfer to mixed classes.

The case highlights that governments need to be aware of designing policies that fulfill individuals' human rights in a non-discriminatory manner. The key outcome from this case is that government policies need to be designed and implemented with an active involvement of the individuals concerned. In addition, the state's appropriate positive measures have to take into account the various social divisions, characteristics, and features that shape the lives of those concerned. Otherwise will well-intended policies become contrary to integration and diversity and in the end a breach of the human right to non-discrimination, here particularly in relation to the right to education.

The intention of the Croatian state to implement segregated classes for Roma-children was meant to increase the language capacity of Roma children and as such fulfill the children's right to education. However, by not sufficiently following up this policy, the Roma-children experienced discrimination. They were treated differently from other children without any sufficiently good reason. Being without language, being a minor and belonging to a minority, led in this case to the outcome that special classes or schools were discriminatory even though their purpose was legitimate; to address the issue of lack of language capacities. Policies of affirmative action or policies with positive action must be addressed with a human rights-based approach, meaning that the discourse must be about non-discrimination. I order to establish a discourse that avoids discrimination either during the design of a policy or its implementation, the human rights of the individuals and the characteristics, features and social divisions shaping their lives, must be articulated.

The human rights-based approach does not only demand awareness of all human rights and of the experience of single or multiple discrimination. The human rights based approach also points out that policies of integration, diversity and non-discrimination only work if we know the individual's relationships with family, kinship or other important social groups, such as his or her congregation of faith.

It is likewise necessary to be sensitive and to understand the various social, cultural, and religious norms that form the life of a human being. Unless the human rights-based approach by a state does not also include these norms when designing policies, there will be little success in promoting the individual's human right to, for example, education, work, or health care. Policy makers need to be aware of which norms are shaping people's lives. Otherwise, human-rights policies will likely fail.

Yet, simultaneously, it is a duty for the state actor to implement policies that are targeted at social, cultural, or religious norms that violate the human rights of the members of the group. The Human Rights Committee, a supervisory body of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has stated the following with regard to women's human rights in relation to group rights in its general comment no. 28 in 1994. This statement is a guideline for any policy design and implementation where the question of a proportional assessment of individual rights versus group rights is at stake.

> *"The rights which persons belonging to minorities enjoy under article 27 of the Covenant in respect of their language, culture and religion do not authorize any State, group or person to violate the right to the equal enjoyment by women of any Covenant rights, including the right to equal protection of the law. States should report on any legislation or administrative practices related to membership in a minority community that might constitute an infringement of the equal rights of women under the Covenant (communication No. 24/1977, Lovelace v. Canada, Views adopted July 1981) and on measures taken or envisaged to ensure the equal right of men and women to enjoy all civil and political rights in the Covenant. Likewise, States should report on measures taken to discharge their responsibilities in relation to cultural or religious practices within minority communities that affect the rights of women. In their reports, States parties should pay attention to the contribution made by women to the cultural life of their communities."*[14]

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[14] General comment no. 28, CCPR, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, (2000), para. 32.

This rather long citation highlights the responsibility of the state actor to actively work against discrimination of group members within their group.

Summary

Summarizing the main features of the human rights-based approach and its impact on the design of state policies targeted at integration and at the same time providing diversity, it is the state's obligation to balance various characteristics, interests, social divisions, norms, and rights in a manner that is non-discriminatory. The human rights-based approach must inform policy design and implementation by public authorities. Well-intended policies must not become discriminatory based on gender, race, age, poverty, illiteracy, cultural norms, religious norms, and other forms of characteristics, features, and social divisions. The complex lives of individuals must be integrated into policy design and implementation. Thus, the human rights-based approach gives a voice to the individual and includes broad variety of rights and interests, non-hierarchic, indivisible, interdependent, and integrated. It further calls for a thorough proportionality assessment of interest and rights whenever conflicts of rights arise. The approach is also a necessary tool to address the right to non-discrimination based on various grounds of characteristics, factors, and social divisions, and it requires a sensitive approach to every individual's complex identities embedded in legal, cultural, religious, and social norms, called "relationships." Last, but not least, the human rights-based approach requires the abolishment of discriminatory practices against group members within social, cultural, or religious groups.

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Chapter 4

Challenges to the Study of Modernization of Public Administration in Latvia and Norway: From Pre-Weber to Good Governance

Harald Koht[1] and Iveta Reinholde[2]

This proposed study will present findings from the authors' research on public service delivery in Norway and Latvia. By providing a comparative perspective the authors aim to show that while some of the problems faced by public officials in the two countries may be quite similar, there are also some inherent cultural issues that are particularly vexing in countries where the tradition of public service has yet to be firmly established. Efforts to modernize public administration must take account of these differences.

A multilevel view of public administration

The current critique of public administration is to a large extent based on claims that it fails to serve the citizens by being too bureaucratic, too rule-based, and too hung up in "red tape." This type of criticism has resulted in efforts at modernization to make public administration more efficient and responsive to citizen demands. Since the 1980s these attempts at "re-inventing government" have generally been labeled New Public Management. However, these efforts often fail to consider whether "real-

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ly existing" public administration fits the ideal-type model of bureaucracy as described by Max Weber in his seminal work on governance.[3]

In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that a major challenge to public administration in many countries consists of its frequent failure to live up to reasonable expectations regarding impartiality, rationality, rule-based decision-making, honesty, and other characteristics of Weber-type bureaucracy. These failures may be especially relevant in countries in various stages of development or transition, but also highly-developed countries suffer instances of breakdown or disasters that expose flaws in their administrative systems. In these cases we can speak of the re-surfacing of cultural traits and beliefs that pre-date the administrative ideals of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber.

While Max Weber himself can be credited for pointing out that a negative aspect of bureaucracy consists of depersonalization, Robert K. Merton in his seminal article "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality" of 1940 performed the groundwork for the systematic critique of bureaucracy that has been the departing point for efforts at administrative reform ever since. Merton pointed specifically at such "dysfunctions of bureaucracy" as goal displacement and the rigidity of the bureaucratic personality. This early critique has been the foundation stone for administrative reform efforts ever since.

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[3] For a typical example of this approach to the study public administration reforms in Europe see the report by G. Hammerschmid, S. Van de Walle, A. Oprisor and V. Štimac: Trends and Impact of Public Administration Reforms in Europe: Views and Experiences from Senior Public Sector Executives. European Policy Brief, European Commission, Brussels, September 2013.

The focus on "dysfunctions" in formulating demands for reform fits well with the ideas of paradigm shifts introduced by Thomas L. Kuhn. In this view the introduction of the bureaucratic model of public administration represents a regime change that invalidates all previous approaches. In this respect, Kuhn's followers have disregarded his admonition that, "A student in the humanities has constantly before him a number of competing and incommensurable solutions to these problems, solutions that he must ultimately examine for himself." In this respect public administration belongs to the soft sciences.

What could these non-bureaucratic or pre-modern problems of public administration possibly be? While some key concepts in this regard would be quite familiar even to-day, others may just have historical significance: Despotism, corruption, nepotism, simony, patronage, scapegoating, willful arbitrariness, and disregard for the rule of law. These are factors that can have deleterious effects on the quality of decision-making, equal treatment, and fairness. In his book on the Italian renaissance, Jacob Burckhardt in discussing "The State as a Work of Art" pointed at the flagrant nepotism of Sixtus IV as a particular evil aspect of the corruption of the political system. The efforts of this pope and his followers in 1473 to make the papal throne inheritable, "threatened at one time to destroy the Papacy altogether" (1990, p. 83).

The royal coup that paved the way for the absolute rule of the king in the united realms of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway in the 1660s had as a consequence the introduction of a centralized bureaucratic structure of government. The coup was supported by the clergy and the bourgeoisie that battled the arbitrary power of the nobility (Mykland 1977). However, as we shall see, bureaucracy did not put an end to all aspects of pre-Weberian government,.

While in the popular mind the Soviet system represented the embodiment of excessive bureaucracy, this was not so according to scholars such as Anders Åslund. The communist administration was not all that large, and most countries saw their bureaucracies swell with the transition (Åslund 2002, 373). For obvious reasons, few contemporary studies of the public administration from this era can be found. However, Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1918-2008) provided fictionalized accounts on how everyday life could be affected by the willful arbitrariness of powerful officials. In the tale "For the Good of the Cause" Solzhenitsyn (1963) showed how the voluntary efforts of students to build a new school for themselves were upset when the completed building was turned over to a research institute by party officials.

For Woodrow Wilson and his Progressive allies in the 19th century an important target for reform in the United States consisted of the practice of patronage usually called the "spoils system". Patronage allowed winners of elections to fill appointed offices with political friends and relatives. The solution was civil service reform enacted on the federal level in 1883. However, in a recent book on African public administration, Merilee S. Grindle (2012) makes the point that patronage system for recruiting officials is not only thriving in many countries, but also has some beneficial aspects.

Pre-Weberian aspects of modern public administration

This section re-examines pertinent findings of previous research conducted by the authors and other public administration scholars.

Some years ago one of the authors of this paper conducted with the help of student assistants a survey of the openness of Latvian public agencies to citizen requests for information. The telephone survey included simple questions regarding

the size of their agencies and their budgets that should according to law be available to anyone. Yet, officials often refused to provide the requested information over the phone. Sometimes, this refusal appears as stone-walling ("passing the buck") or asking for written requests (bureaucratic "red tape"). More surprisingly, the official would demand that the caller should appear in person at the ministry or independent agency to get the information (Koht 2003, 186). This locating of trust only in face-to-face meetings, that is the need to see a face, can be found in many societies, according to Pollitt and Bouckhaert (2000, 158).

More recently, both authors have been involved in a project to study elderly care at the local government level in three countries, Norway, Latvia, and Lithuania (Kjørstad & Tufte, 2014). The research focuses on the importance of legal thinking, professional attitudes, and personal ethics in deciding individual cases by local government officials. As shown in Table 1, the emphases in regard to core administrative values vary considerably in each of these three countries. Norway and Latvia can be found at extreme ends, while Lithuania occupies the middle position.

The variables in Table 4.1 have been drawn from the work of Stewart et al (1997, 2002). While Norwegian respondents put a heavy emphasis on respect for the law (4) and rational action (5), Latvians are concerned that they may be punished for making the wrong decisions (1), and they tend to emphasize the need to maintain long-term relationships with other people to get along (5).

Table 4.1. Relevant concerns in deciding cases in elderly care. Average scores of respondents in each country. Ranked according to stages of ethical reasoning. N≈101.				
	Norway	*Latvia*	*Lithuania*	*p*
1. I can be punished for making the wrong decision.	39.4	61.1	39.7	**
2. I have to maintain good relations with other people involved in this case.	60.3	65.7	66,6	
3. I have to maintain long-term relationships with other people to get along.	49.3	71.9	64.0	**
4. Respect for the authority of law is part of one's obligation to society.	81.5	66.4	77,4	**
5 (P). My plan of action needs to be rational and strive for the equal treatment of all.	82.6	67.7	81,8	**

Notes: Scores higher than 50 indicate support or agreement with the statement. Scores below 50 indicate disagreement. Varying *n* for each statement.
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple Sample Test for comparing distributions across groups:
** Answers are significantly different at the p<0,01 level
Source: Kjørstad & Tufte, 2014, table 5.3

Overall, the Norwegian case-workers seem so rule-oriented that they may appear overly rigid in their interpretation of client rights and needs, and in that sense be typical of the "dysfunctions of bureaucracy" outlined by Robert K. Merton.

However, the fear of reprisals expressed by Latvian case workers may be a sign of pre-Weberian public administration, but this phenomenon is not unknown to modern management theorists such as Kathleen D. Ryan and Daniel K. Oestreich (1998).

Further analysis

This preliminary sketch will be expanded through the re-examination of reports and data from recent research on Latvian and Norwegian public administration.

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Chapter 5

Freedom of Expression and the Role of the Media – a European Perspective

Kristin Skare Orgeret[1]

This article focuses on issues of integration and diversity in European media and aspects of freedom of speech. It starts with a discussion of what Europe is, before presenting Norway's somewhat particular relationship to the EU. To illustrate the differences and similarities between European countries, a quick overview of the media history of Latvia and Norway is presented. The main categories of European media systems are offered as part of a discussion of a possible homogenization of the traditional media models. The right to freedom of expression and the crisis in Europe are discussed, and so is the argument that a crisis of journalism is rapidly threatening to become a serious problem for democracy in Europe. Today, we gain access to information and knowledge that just some years ago were beyond our imagination, and we can make our voices heard in a wide range of ways. Some of the possibilities and challenges to freedom of expression in Europe today are deliberated, and the discussion has a direct bearing on debates about limits to freedom of speech and journalistic practices.

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Which Europe?

Before introducing the discussion on integration and diversity in European media, a small but important question is required: What is Europe? There is of course no simple answer to the question. Europe is such a diverse concept that it is almost easier to say what Europe is not than what Europe is. Even the more specific question where is Europe? is somewhat complicated to answer. Historically, one of the first maps presenting Europe as a separate entity is Europa Regina – Queen Europe.

Figure 5.1. Europa Regina

This depiction of the European continent as a queen was introduced during the early Modern Age. During this period maps typically adhered to Jerusalem-centred maps depicting Europe, Asia, and Africa together and separate maps of Europe were extremely rare. In Europa Regina, Europe is shown standing upright with

the Iberian Peninsula forming the queen's crowned head and Bohemia her heart. Only the Southern tip of Sweden is shown as Skandia. Norway is not included in this depiction of Europe. Some would argue that not much has changed at that point, as today—talking about Europe—many think of the European Union, EU with its 28 countries where Norway is not included. The country is not an official member of the European Union as a result of two European referenda. In 1972, a majority of 53.5% Norwegians said no to joining the then European Economic Community and in 1994, 52.2% of the voters rejected EU membership. Nevertheless, Norway is a member of the internal market through the EEA agreement. The EEA agreement entered into force on 1 January 1994 and provides for the inclusion of the EU legislation covering the four freedoms: the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital – throughout the present 31 EEA states – Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway in addition to the EU member states. Furthermore, the Agreement ensures cooperation in other central areas such as research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism, and culture.

The EEA agreement grants Norway access to the EU's single market, while Norway is required to adopt most EU legislation related to that market. An evaluation from 2012 showed that Norway has incorporated approximately three-quarters of all EU legislative acts into Norwegian legislation, and has implemented them more effectively than many of the EU member states. Simultaneously, Norway is not involved in the decision-making processes to any significant extent (NOU 2012). Additionally Norway provides 3 billion NOK (EUR 347 million) in EU grants a year to reduce social and economic disparities and promote cooperation in Europe. Through the EEA agreement, Norway pays a higher amount per inhabitant than countries such as France and Italy (http://www.eu-norway.org). According to the 2012 evalua-

tion of Norway's relationship to the EU, Norway is both outside and inside the EU – simultaneously (NOU 2012:3).

There is no doubt that EU has increased its power and importance both in its relation to Norway, within the region and internationally in the last years. However Europe is more than EU. From a media perspective it is interesting to see that the EBU, the European Broadcasting Union, has members in as many as 56 countries. Of these, 54 countries have participated in the Eurovision song contest since it was initiated in 1956. Hence, several countries geographically outside the boundaries of Europe have competed, among them Israel, Cyprus, Armenia and Morocco. And some transcontinental countries, with only part of their territory in Europe have participated, such as Turkey, Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Thus, there is no single definition of what Europe is, and even if we agree on a quite minimum version of the concept, including the EU countries and the EFTA states Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland[2,] we find an area with large diversities and a wide range of cultures, languages and traditions.

Languages, cultures, traditions, geopolitics, history, economy, development, political systems – all these elements affect the respective countries media systems. The differences in media systems come to the fore through a range of different media histories and regulation systems – through the media industry and its total output – and the demand side – the publics or the consumers and their use and purchase of media products and services.

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[2] Switzerland is not part of the EEA Agreement, but has a bilateral agreement with the EU.

Media Systems in Europe

Freedom of information and the right of access to official information have increased their importance in recent years, and are now considered parts of the right to freedom of expression. The right of access to official information is included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000, and rules regulating access to official information were set out in 2001 (Jørgensen 2013: 95). The rules apply to documents held by European Union institutions, including documents submitted to the Union by Member States. However, EU has no power to set aside national legislation on access to information, while access to EU documents that are sought via a national authority in a Member State or other third country is regulated by national legislation in the country in question. There are significant differences in how the laws providing for freedom of information and freedom of expression are constructed and the context of media systems within which they operate.

For the sake of illustrating differences and similarities between European countries, the following section takes a quick look at the media history of Latvia and Norway. Latvia was a part of the Russian Empire until 1918, then independent for 20 years, before it was occupied by Nazi and Soviet forces during the Second World War and became part of the Soviet Union from 1940-1991. Latvia is a EU member since 2004. Norway is, as shown above, outside the Union. Norway's history is also marked by domination by more powerful neighbours. The last union with Sweden was dissolved in 1905, and some historians point at the fact that 434 years of union with Denmark and 91 years with Sweden gave a bad ring to the concept of union in Norway, a scepticism that was important in the opposition to Norwegian membership in the European Union at the referenda in 1972 and 1994 (Strand 2014).

The Baltic States and Scandinavia have also shared many events and situations over the centuries, and Latvia and Norway interestingly have some common traits in terms of media history. Both Latvians and Norwegians have long been united through the tradition of newspaper reading, and both countries have a strong print media history.

In Scandinavia, the growth of an independent peasantry together with a high proportion of literacy that followed the Protestant reformation was a particularly important societal development (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 186-187). This was also true in Latvia, especially after the first translation of the bible into Latvian in 1695 (Dimants 2008). Hence in both Latvia and Norway, newspapers played an increasingly important role in shaping public opinion and in ensuring national and social emancipation towards the end of 18th century.

Media scholars Hallin & Mancini (2004) introduced their triadic paradigm through which they analyse the media system of the European countries. The Nordic countries and several Central European Countries are defined in terms of a 'democratic corporatist model' with a high degree of political parallelism, where a strong tendency for media to express partisan and other social divisions cohabits with a strongly developed mass-circulation press. This high level of political parallelism in the media coexists with a high level of journalistic professionalization, which includes a high degree of consensus on professional standards, a commitment to a common public interest, and a high level of autonomy from other social powers. Since the birth of modern journalism in Europe in the 17th century, some standardized values have become core to the profession of journalism (see e.g. Høyer and Lauk 2003). Such professional ethics are not static, but do as Stephen A. J Ward (2013) emphasizes, consist of dynamic frameworks of principles and values.

Hallin and Mancini suspect the Democratic Corporatist model to have particularly strong relevance for the analysis of those parts of Eastern and Central Europe that share much of the same historical development of the Scandinavian countries, like the Baltic states (2004: 305). Ainars Dimants agrees, and says that the Democratic Corporatist Model of media systems also corresponds well to Latvian media development (2008: 37).

After the occupation of Latvia in 1940 many journalists were killed or repressed, and the Soviet press-system was fully imposed. The period of Perestroika followed by independence has been characterised as a 'golden period' for media in Latvia. Radio Latvia served as a propaganda tool under communism, but had its glorious days in the liberation period of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the early 1990s the press system was restructured, and the media had quickly to learn to exist in a democratic system and not least in a market economy. Scholars describe how the Latvian authoritarian heritage at times may function as an obstacle for re-integration in the Democratic Corporatist Model (Dimants 2008:38).

Contemporary Norwegian media – print and online, newspapers, tv, radio and the Internet – are all in varying degrees shaped by the forces of the free market but are controlled, regulated and supervised by state intervention. This is a reflection of the mixed economies of all the Nordic countries, with their blending of public and private sectors. This is what Croteau and Hoynes in their paradigm entitles a 'public sphere model', whereas the traditional US model is named a 'market model'. Today the media scenes in the Nordic countries all have elements of both models: We can rather talk of a hybrid media model, where a public sphere model has incorporated important market model elements. Importantly, the conditions for freedom of expression in Northern Europe are changing. Arne Krumsvik describes how a move towards a Liberal model driven by digitization and commercialisation of news me-

dia, professionalization of journalism, and European trade regulations may challenge the legitimacy of state intervention in the media markets for the purpose of facilitating freedom of expression (2013: 61).

Hallin and Mancini analysed a number of Mediterranean countries through a 'polarized pluralist model', and the UK and Ireland were defined by a 'liberal model' (2004). Currently there are reasons to argue that there are an increasing tendency to unite or integrate the media systems, at least across Europe. We are moving towards a homogenization of the traditional media models. The driving forces in this process are digitization and globalisation, but also internal forces in Europe, such as increasing commercialisation and a political shift from a collectivist to a more individualistic political culture. Furthermore the role of public service broadcasting has declined significantly in most European countries compared to the situation 10-15 years ago.

Most news media in Europe, and worldwide, are still national, but journalism is increasingly challenged by overarching transnational or global processes such as ownership, surveillance, and technology, but also climate change, conflicts, and financial crises. The global challenges to journalism and to media markets indicate that the actors have to find new solutions to the current crises—some of these will be transnational rather than national. The dimension of international actors and cross ownership is also significant: An example here might be how Schibsted Baltics bought 100% of the shares in Latvia's TVNET.lv. in March 2011, the second biggest internet news site in Latvia. The investment is Schibsted's first presence in Latvia and an important step in order to strengthen its presence in Baltic internet market (Salovaara and Juzefovics 2011).

The right to freedom of speech and expression

The Universal Human Rights, and not least the right to freedom of speech and expression have become more accentuated, both nationally and internationally in the last years. This is reflected within European organisations such as the Council of Europe, which consists of 47 member states promoting cooperation between all countries of Europe in the areas of human rights and democratic development. The Council has an inter-governmental Steering Committee on Media and Information Society (CDMSI), which is drafting proposals for the enforcement of states' obligation to protect the principle of freedom of expression and the safety of journalists. Safety is a cross-cutting issue. It is relevant to freedom of expression because it is a precondition for journalists to work without anxiety and fear.

Reporters without Borders (RWB)'s yearly press freedom index provides a good tool for the study of the degree of diversity in the European media sphere. Every year the RWB monitor attacks on freedom of information in 150 countries internationally. Many criteria are considered, ranging from legislation to violence against journalists. The numbers from 2012 show that sixteen EU members are still within the top 30 best performing countries (with Norway and Finland on top), but they also indicate that the European model is decaying. The problems connected to bad legislation seen in 2011 continued, especially in Italy (number 57 of the 150, +4 since 2011), where defamation has yet to be decriminalized, and state agencies make dangerous use of ban laws. Hungary (56th, -16) is still paying the price of its repressive legislative reforms, which had a major impact on the way journalists work. But Greece's dramatic fall (84th, -14) is even more disturbing. The social and professional environment is disastrous for its journalists, who are exposed to public condemnation and violence from both extremist groups and the police.

The RWB list displays examples of democracies that stall or go into reverse. Lithuania, Latvia, and Spain also experienced decline in their press freedom from 2011 to 2012. Also according to the Washington D.C based Freedom House's Global Press Freedom Rankings (2013), Norway and Sweden have the freest media in the world, whereas Latvia's score has fallen to 28, only three points away from the Partly Free category. In the words of Jennifer Dunham and Zselyke Csaky at the Freedom House, commenting on the situation of Latvia:

> *"[D]eclining advertising revenues since 2008 have caused media outlets' budgets to shrink, resulting in tabloidization and the use of recycled content. Forced to search for new sources of income, some outlets have engaged in the questionable practice of "hidden advertising" in which paid content is improperly disguised as news. Political interference in editorial policies has raised concerns, and the country is battling a growing trend of violence against journalists. The 2010 murder of newspaper owner Grigorijs Nemcovs remains unsolved, and last year another journalist reporting on corruption and organized crime was badly beaten and shot at" (Dunham and Csaky 2013).*

The authors further describe how the European economic crisis coincided with the decline in press freedom in the EU, aggravating deep-rooted problems across Europe's media environments and leading to a decline in print media circulation and diversity, as well as a greater concentration of media ownership. As governments and media sectors felt the impact of the economic crisis that began in 2008, the state-run and private media suffered staff and salary cuts, declines in advertising revenue, and even the closure of outlets (Dunham and Csaky 2013). In Spain for instance, 57 media outlets have closed since 2008, and around one-sixth of the country's journal-

ists have lost their jobs – those who remain receive only half of their pre-crisis salaries.

Greek media have also endured widespread staff cutbacks and some closures of outlets. Journalists also face increased legal and physical harassment and pressure from owners or politicians to toe a certain editorial line. These factors damage the media's ability to perform their watchdog role and keep citizens adequately informed about election campaigns, austerity measures, corruption, and other critical issues, not least in these times of crisis (Dunham and Csaky 2013).

A crisis in European journalism?

The European radio network Euranet organised a conference in Brussels in March 2012 entitled the Crisis in European Journalism. The conference discussed how as a result of the economic crisis and a growing dissatisfaction with EU issues, many media outlets have reduced their presence in Brussels. The declining number of Brussels correspondents also illustrates the crisis of journalism within the European countries, which according to Euranet "each year is less exhaustive and more focused on national angles" (Euranet 2012) and where a news story only becomes relevant if it has someone from your country in it – the 'homely filter' as it is often referred to. Furthermore there are increasing tendencies to tabloidization, or what Richard Sennett (1977) many years ago referred to as 'the tyranny of intimacy', or to 'infotainment,' where even serious information has to be presented in an entertaining manner. As a result there is a widespread neglect of business, politics, and international news in favour of less serious content.

The European media landscape is changing at an extraordinary speed. Ownership concentration, closures of newspapers, reductions, and increased workload on each individual journalist correspond with the outpouring of an unprecedented

amount of unedited information on the Internet. Some argue that a crisis of journalism is rapidly threatening to become a serious problem for democracy in Europe.[3]

The time and money required for reports to be in-depth and thoroughly verified have become rare commodities. In the new media landscape the investigative journalist who provides quality information might end up on the list of endangered species. We are in the middle of times of change, where many researchers see a future marked by 'de-professionalization' of journalists (Waisboard 2013). Today anyone with Internet access can be a distributor of information to a potential mass audience – so when 'anybody' can produce media content what are then left to media professionals?

Hence, the *crisis* has also sparked serious challenges to the journalistic profession as such in Europe. As thousands of jobs have been lost and dozens of outlets have been shut down, newsrooms are denied of some of its most veteran and talented professionals, and this strikes at journalism's most valued asset: credibility.

To respond to the crisis, EU has launched its 2020 initiative for new growth in the union.[4] It consists of seven flagship initiatives. The first one is entitled digital agenda for Europe. Technology is playing a pivotal role in the shaping media history. Technology is arguably the key driving force in media marketization and probably the way forward to escape the crisis. Also in the European context we need to learn more from each other, to share knowledge and context about innovation, experiences of integration as well as of diversity. Such exchange is crucial as a means to ensure

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[3] See e.g. Ethical Journalism Network http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/en.

[4] a.eu/europe2020/pdf/europe_2020_explained.pdf<.

that globalisation does not take place at the expense of knowledge about, and reflections on different societies and cultures.

At the same time we see how advances in technology and changes in the political and social context in which the digital technologies operate give rise to a number of dilemmas. Traditional media and their various platforms on the Internet and mobile telephone today operate in contexts that are different from those that prevailed when most of the fundamental declarations and resolutions regarding media and human rights were adopted on the global and European arena. The large-scale spying over global communications networks, revealed by NSA leaker Edward Snowden in 2013, definitely poses a threat to Internet freedoms and this shows very clearly that the technological context is radically different today than for instance in 1948 when the UN Declaration of Human Rights was adopted.

The rapid changes demand new approaches and strategies to ensure the full and proper application of the fundamental freedoms. Communication society today has an enormous potential to add to and enhance democracy, human rights, and social justice. We also see how readers crave for more in-depth content through newspapers which offer analysis and background, in contrast to the rapid news flows that are almost everywhere. The crisis in the media field illustrates a dire need for innovation and new ideas. How to develop profitable solutions for good journalism on the net is one of the core questions. Furthermore particular responses to global challenges are needed and those who manage to come up with new and creative solutions will be the winners of tomorrow or next week.

Hopefully, there are such tendencies to new creativity among some media institutions and among journalists in Europe. *Innovation processes of new digital services are going on, as well as content forms are explored through living images and ex-*

plorative net tv. The small local Norwegian newspaper *Hallingdølen* is an example of such creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship; the small newspaper with 9400 copies last year, has developed an internet version that has received much acclamation and in early 2014 won a prestigious award for being the best local newspaper in Europe. *Hallingdølen* has devised particular responses to some of the global challenges: it has created an innovative web version where it combines professional values and photojournalistic feature stories, and insists on giving ordinary people a voice.

Free expression – where to draw the line?

Freedom of expression is regarded as a universal concept in Europe. Free expression is often seen as *the* most important right as it provides the basis of other human rights. The affirmative effects of freedom of speech for the discovery of truth was the starting point for many thinkers: John Stuart Mills' reasoning is for instance based on the idea that we have to acknowledge the possibility that other opinions may be true, and even if they are not true we need them to keep the true opinions alive. Furthermore we need 'wrong' opinions too, in order to improve our own merely partial truths. His main idea therefore was that if everyone were free to express their thoughts, this would result in the enhancement of human intellectual powers and in turn benefit the common good. At the same time, the right to freedom of speech and expression is closely related to other rights, and may be limited when conflicting with other rights. Napoleon Bonaparte is known to have said that – "*A people which is able to say everything becomes able to do everything."*

Most people agree that hate speech is unacceptable. That utterances may be destructive even if they are not immediately followed by actions. Hate speech is a seriously damaging action in itself and may prepare communities or societies for more horrible actions to take place at a later stage. Some, among them the Norwegian

scholar Helge Rønning argues that no, we must separate between hate speech and hate acts, this separation is as essential as the distinction between causing harm and causing offence. Helge Rønning continues "what some regard as blasphemy is seen as legitimate critique of religion by others. Who in a democratic society is to decide what is what? Instead of maintaining a right to not be offended, one should argue for the right to be offended. Offence in itself is part of being taken seriously in a society of equal rights for all groups and individuals." (2013:16).

The limit between acceptable and unacceptable utterances is always at the centre of debates of freedom of expression. Most people agree that there has to be limits to free speech. It is *where* to draw the line between freedom of speech and other rights that is the challenging and very interesting question.

It is highly important that specific conditions must be considered when discussing freedom of speech, such as the issue of power distribution. It does matter whether it is a vulnerable minority or a powerful majority that is offended. This echoes the work of enlightenment anti-imperialists, such as Denis Diderot, that reflects their struggle with the tension between universalistic concepts such as human rights and the realities of cultural pluralism. The legacy of Diderot's ideas makes it easier to argue for particular responses to a universal principle in a contemporary context. Diderot's solution was to identify particularity as the universal human trait. In other words, he emphasized that human beings all share similar desires to create workable rules of conduct that allow particular ways of life to flourish without themselves creating harsh injustices and cruelties (see also Orgeret 2011).

For a long period of time in most European countries, freedom of speech was very little debated and became almost a self-evident concept. Then things started to change—the world became smaller and societies more diverse. The debates exploded

with the so-called cartoon crisis of 2006. Where are the limits to be drawn between freedom of expression on the one hand and the respect of others' religion on the other? Most European states have become much more complex, multi-ethnic and multi-religious, and it is important to remember, not least in increasingly complex societies, that having the right to offend does not necessarily mean that you have to make use of this right at all times.

The growth of new digital communication technologies and the Internet has raised important concerns as we experience that the Internet represents a new and powerful tool for hate mongers and extremists, or to what has come to be called "cyberhate" or "cyber-racism". Even with laws against intimidating speech, the anonymity of the Internet at times makes it difficult to track down and prosecute perpetrators of threatening messages. In the Scandinavian countries there has been a worrying increase of harassment of female politicians, journalists and other public profiles the last years (see e.g Bjurwald 2013). Female members of Parliament (MPs) are frequent targets of anonymous sexual harassment from the public, often of a nature so obscene and graphic that they dread having to turn the e-mails and text messages they receive over to the police. They are being encouraged, though, to go public with the problem and a few do. Some of the harassment is simply mean, insulting and degrading. Other messages are pornographic and clearly aimed at upsetting or frightening their female recipients, including photos and text messages so obscene that most media would not publish them. The extent of the problem is worrying. We see similar tendencies of harassment towards people from a different ethnic background. It is a serious problem for democracy. The worst outcome would be in case females and immigrants, business leaders, researchers, or politicians were threatened away from participating in the public debate. Then it would to an even larger extent than today, be white men that set the public agenda and political priorities.

Journalism and the media shape the way we understand and think about the world, the way we perceive ourselves and our surroundings, and the way we relate to one another and society at large. Furthermore, journalism and the press shape the way in which core societal concepts like 'democracy' and 'freedom of expression' are understood and practiced. Journalism and the press therefore function as a cultural prerequisite for societal change at large and for the dissemination and communication of ideas of democracy and freedom of expression in particular. Hence journalism, freedom of expression, and media systems may function as a litmus test for democracy in a specific society. Inadequate pluralism in media ownership, suppressing of voices of particular views, or official or unofficial harassment of journalists and people who speak out are signs of a not too well functioning public sphere. The right to freedom of expression and freedom of information can only exist where the media, the journalists, and the people who participate in the public debate feel secure.

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Chapter 6

Ethno-Political Conflicts and Diversities in National Identities in Latvia

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As conceptual guidelines for the analysis of ethno-political conflicts and national identities in our study in Latvia, we rely on Huntington's (1993) theory of cultural identities, or "civilizations" involved in inevitable conflicts. We share the conviction that the "identity matters." Our particular contribution consists in focusing on micro ethno-political and cultural communities and identities in one region - Latvia. Our interest was caused by the way the Latvian nation and its ethnic groups, as well as forming their identities (within the Western and Slavic-Orthodox civilization) constitute a clash or a tolerant coexistence.

The inevitable nature of the politization of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in multicultural ethnic societies, which were pointed out in the writings of Horowitz (1985), makes up the methodological foundation for understanding the causes and dynamics of ethnic and cultural relations in Latvia. From the point of view of the theory of democracy, ethnic conflict is a threat to the democratic regime, especially in the case of the dominant ethnic group of subordinated ethnic minorities.

In current approaches to the analysis of conflicts and identities, we adhere to the primordial version of the study of conflicts. According to this version of ethnic

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studies, the type of primordial ethnic group is the cause of the conflict, which is irrational, affective and, in principle, insoluble. "The nutritional basis" of these conflicts is "sacred symbols" of the past, religious, ethnic, and cultural heritage. Primordial ethnic conflict and national identity are often embodied in various forms of violence or confrontation

We do not believe that ethnic and cultural conflicts can be explained only by a deficit of social and economic resources or macro-economic crises. Explanatory causes of ethnic conflicts a priori include a number of "factors hard to explain." Therefore primordialism traditionally views Huntington's "clash of civilizations" as inevitable and non-permissive.

The field of testing the primordial approach to the analysis of conflicts and identities for us is ethnic democracy in Latvia[3]. Ethnic democracy in Latvia includes a number of features: first, the existence of institutional dominance of the titular nation and the total supply of resources for a mono-ethnic hegemony of the ruling elite, and secondly, the lack of democratic representation of ethnic minorities and inequality in the possession of civil rights and liberties.

Goal

The goal of this paper is to analyze the interaction of ethnic and cultural identities of ethnic and cultural pluralism as a catalyst or conflicts in the Latvian society. Hence, the main issues will be figuring out what are the basic models of national identity within the hierarchic ethno-political stratification in Latvia, and the conditions under

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[3] See S. Smouha and P. Jaarve (2005) for the theoretical basis for this approach.

which political identity and the diversity of ethnic and cultural identity of different nationalities contribute to the democratic consensus or result in mutual confrontation.

The dependent and independent variables. Ethnic and cultural identities as factors of ethnic and cultural conflicts for us act as the independent variables. Demonstration of motivational readiness and behavioral acts of a conflict between the various ethno-cultural and ethnic communities are dependent variables.

Research hypotheses

1. The commitment to the conflict and its implementation in the acts of opposition to the regime in Latvia is directly connected to the ethno-political and ethno-cultural components of national identity of the dominant and subordinated titular ethnic minorities;

2. The crisis of liberal-democratic multicultural and ethnic societies contributes to the political radicalization of ethnic and cultural minorities that demands greater recognition and implementation of their cultural practices and identities.

Methods and data

The analysis of national identity and ethnic conflicts in Latvia was conducted as a sociological survey August - September 2011 by prof. A. Gaponenko and prof. M. Rodins of the Latvian Institute of European Studies. The analysis of the ethno-political and social relations in Latvia was carried out before and after the parliamentary elections of 2010. On the background of a deepening economic and institutional crisis in Latvia this study describes and analyzes the radicalization of ethno-political behavior and mass consciousness.

The applied research methods represent a combination of quantitative analysis in the measurement of national identity and ethnic conflicts and qualitative methods to describe the characteristics of the Latvian ethno-democracy. Our main intention was to conduct a one-panel population study based on a proportional representative sample of the national socio-demographic population and by applying stratification parameters (technical description of the sampling strategy is given in Appendix 6.1). Polling data were collected through questionnaires, formal interviews with 1,102 respondents in Latvia. The questionnaire in Russian and Latvian contains more than 1000 variables and parameters.

The results of the study

Political identity in the Latvian political process

National identity can be explained as a set of internalized political and cultural norms and types of behavior that are transformed through political socialization from one generation to another within the appointed ethnic group. Structurally national identity consists of two communities: political identity and ethnic and cultural identity.

We present the first general data measuring the political identity of the residents of Latvia. Political identity is generally regarded as the official membership in a political community (or state-territorial entities). According to the selected methodology, political identity is revealed in the process of inclusion in the political community and the internalization of state-forming national symbols. In the process of identification with national symbols, people take up a collective identity and a sense of continuity. National symbols, hardly affected by historical modifications, have a big ethno-mobilizing role in the integration process of nation building.

Each of the areas of political identification has a specific set of variables, which were selected after a preliminary examination and reflect the empirical values. Moreover, the research attention was focused more on the personal identification using a set of formalized relations with the political community and political symbolism. Based on previous studies of ethno-political processes in Latvia at the Institute of European Studies, we chose as operational variables for the identification of the political community of the respondents, the following items: general attachment to Latvia, Latvian independence, support, satisfaction with democracy in Latvia and in relation to the institution of citizenship. Alternative identities refer respectively to Russia and the European Union in related fields.

In turn, the forming of personal identity by relating it to ethno-political symbols and values makes it possible to present more clearly the boundaries and content of ethnic cohesion and integrity. To such ethno-cultural and political symbolic markers—forming the collective image of the ethnic majority and ethnic minority communities—belong:

- National state symbols: the flag and anthem,
- National holidays: Independence Day (November 18) , Day of Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia (May 4), and Ligo (June 23),
- National monuments: The Freedom Monument in Riga, Monument to the Liberator Soldier in Riga, and Latgale's Mara in Rezekne,
- National graveyards: Fraternal, Pokrov, and Garrison.

As alternative ethno-cultural and political symbols, which reflect the social spectrum of ethnic and cultural identities, the research instrument included Russian

political symbolism , ethnic and cultural forms, such as the Kremlin in Moscow, Victory Day (May 9), and Labor Day (May 1).

In addition the research model includes indicators of personal satisfaction and motivation to stay in Latvia: the desire to be born and live in Latvia. Similar indicators were addressed to territorial mobility in relation to Russia. The consistency of positive images and identifications by members of the titular nationality and ethnic minorities with selected variables hypothetically forms an ideal model of a successful and integrated political identity in Latvia.

An overview of the political identity of the inhabitants of Latvia is presented in Table 6.1. The data show that more than 80 % of the population identify themselves with Latvia, which, in fact, a strong argument in favor of political integration between the ethnic majority and the ethnic minorities. However, the Russian and other ethnic minorities identify themselves significantly lower than Latvians do with regard to formal membership in the Latvian state. Moreover, ethnic Russian almost equally self-identify themselves with Latvia, as well as with Russia, which, however , is not a contradiction, but only fixes the situation as "imposed" identities, because of both historical co-existence and mobility in an era of rapidly changing national and state boundaries. The problem rather lies in how the identity of the ethnic majority, subordinated ethnic minorities, generates, or, conversely, negates the ethnic conflict in the framework of the national total. The factors that are fundamentally different between ethnic majority and ethnic minorities are expressions of support for the independence of Latvia and the satisfaction of democracy in Latvia. As the data in the Table 6.1 show, only 13.9% of Latvian Russians support Latvia's independence, in believing that "For me, the independence of Latvia has always been one of the most important things."

Table 6.1. Political identity in Latvia by nationalities (%)				
Question: People also feel attached to their country… Question: To what extent do you support…? Questions: To what extent you like or do not like… Question: Where do you wish to born/to live?				
Variables	*Nationalities*			
	Total	Latvians	Russians	Other
Attachment to Latvia	83.3	90.1	74.4	81.3
Attachment to Russia	26.8	6.4	54.6	26.1
Attachment to the European Union	34.9	41.2	23.4	21.6
Support for Latvian independence	45.0	72.0	13.9	27.6
Satisfaction with democracy in Latvia	34.7	51.0	18.6	16.4
Satisfaction with democracy in Russia	31.6	19.7	47.8	31.4
The importance of the Latvian citizenship	62.4	60.2	64.4	65.7
The Latvian national anthem	83.0	97.5	67.8	68.6
The Latvian national flag	85.3	92.6	74.6	70.9
The Russian national anthem	13.6	2.4	27.6	17.1
The Russian national flag	13.0	2.8	25.4	27.0
Monument of Freedom in Riga	71.6	93.9	47.5	52.2
Monument to the Liberator Soldier	48.9	26.0	78.3	53.7
Latgal Mara in Rezekne	25.2	34.1	13.5	24.7
The Kremlin in Moscow	21.3	11.9	34.5	38.1
Independence Day (18November)	58.6	86.6	31.2	34.3
Day of Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia (May 4)	44.4	72.2	15.1	17.9
Ligo (June 23)	84.4	92.4	76.6	74.7
Victory Day (May 9)	47.3	15.5	82.4	72.4
Labor Day (May 1)	21.3	15.6	25.6	31.3
Legionnaires' Day (March 16)	25.9	29.2	2.2	2.2
Fraternal Cemetery in Riga	64.1	81.5	48.1	46.3
Pocrov Cemetery in Riga	14.0	7.2	20.5	23.2
Garrison Cemetery in Riga	9.9	6.4	12.1	17.1
Salaspils memorial	39.3	34.2	45.8	41.0
Fraternal Cemetery in Lestene	26.5	41.6	9.5	15.6
Wish to be born in Latvia	52.3	68.5	34.9	38.1
Wish to live in Latvia	17.2	56.8	33.7	35.8
Wish to be born in Russia	8.4	1.3	18.0	9.0
Wish to live in Russia	30.0	1.8	22.2	9.7

Note: This table contains only positive responses ("very attached" and "more attached", "totally agree" and agree ").

Only 18.6% of these respondents are satisfied with Russian democracy in Latvia. Slightly higher rates of support of independence and satisfaction with democracy in Latvia exist among the remaining ethnic minorities.

Among ethnic minorities there is extremely low territorial identity with Latvia. The proportion of those expressing a desire to be born and live in Latvia is in the range of 30%, the "territorial linkage," which is age and family level. Among the representatives of Latvian nationality, personal satisfaction and motivation to stay in Latvia does not exceed 70%, and the motivation to migrate and live in the countries of Western Europe, the USA, and Canada exceeds similar interest among members of ethnic minorities.

Data concerning personal identification with national symbols perform an important role in estimating successful political integration and national homogenization. In fact, it is the personification of the national symbols of social groups that creates a "nation-state" with signs of stability and sustainability. As can be seen from Table 6.1, there are striking differences in the level of identification with the national symbols among the respondents. Since the response to questions about their personal attachment to symbols such as the national anthem, the flag of Latvia, and the Latvian Freedom Monument among Latvians is a third higher than among the minorities in respect to other identifying factors, the picture appears even more dramatic.

Our research data allows us to express that the most important national symbols, such as national monuments, holidays, and cemeteries are grouped and act as a form of ethnic reproduction of the strictly separated groups of the ethnic majority and the ethnic minorities. The orientation of Latvian Russians and other ethnic minorities towards Russian and Soviet national symbols strengthens their multi-layered political identity and security strategy from the institutional hegemony of the ethnic

majority. The principal differences between the titular nation and the ethnic minorities in the political process of symbolic identification fix "negative identity" as a result of the integration of pseudo-ethnic politics. The separation, consisting of unresolved ethnic conflicts, and the acquired status of peripheral social formations by ethnic minorities—such are the results of ethnic politics and political socialization of the population of Latvia.

In this study, our hypothesis about the political model of Latvia has confirmed the existence of a bi-communal divided society: Latvians are focused on the restoration and support of the nation-state and ethnic minorities (mainly Russians) are more focused on achieving political equality and democratic representation.

Ethno-cultural identity in the Latvian political process

According to our research, in 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2011, the institutional dominance of the Latvian nation, with its characteristic resources protection and internal cohesion, combined with the practice of ethnic and linguistic "narcissism" and cultural revanchism. At the same time, the development of ethnic and cultural minorities in Latvia took place in a strictly subordinated assimilative policy.

Our conceptual model of ethnic and cultural identity in Latvia includes dimensions of ethnic, linguistic, cultural identities and cultural inter-ethnic relations.

Let us turn to the analysis of ethnic identification. According to the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia in 2011, the population of Latvia was 62.1 % Latvians, 26.9 % Russians, and 11.0 % of other nationalities. In our study, we used demographic data prior to publication of the results of the national census, so the total number of Latvians was 57.7%, Russian 30%, and 12.3% of other nationalities. Statistical data as well as data from mass surveys show convincingly the numerically superior group

size of ethnic Latvians, the total number of which increased by 4% in 2011 and makes up more than two thirds of the population.

Ethnic identification, according to our research, is not fundamentally different from statistics on ethnicity. More fractional indicators of ethnic identity can clarify the picture. On the question: "Representatives of what ethnic group is in your family?" 94.1% of Latvians indicated that other family members were Latvians, while 12.2% mentioned other ethnic groups. The situation is similar among members of the non-titular nation. Among Russian Latvians other members of their family and friends are 78.5% ethnic Russian, and only 2.7% Latvians. Representatives of other ethnic entities also make up the majority of the members of their family and friends.

Sufficiently cohesive ethnic identity in Latvia is akin to a strict differentiation status of ethnic minorities. The question: "Do you think you belong to an ethnic minority?" 6.8% of Latvians are willing to accept the status of ethnic minorities, 33.7% of the Russian population, and 55.5% of persons of other groups (Table 6.2).

Inextricably linked to ethnic identification appears linguistic identity, serving as one of the most important preconditions for nation building. And the possession and use of the language of the titular nation by the nation's ethnic minorities are not only expressions of loyalty to the nation, but also serve as one of the key factors in the integrative processes. The use of national languages zones was tested by reference to the linguistic situation in the family. The question: "What language do you speak at home?" 92.7% of Latvians speak in their native language in their families, while respectively 7.3% and 13.4% of Russian people and other ethnic groups also speak Latvian in the family. Conversely, 5.6% of Latvians speak in Russian in their families, while among Russians 91.2% and other groups 80.6% use the Russian language in the family.

In contrast, the use of the Latgal language in the family is not significant (less than 0.6%). Among the representatives of the Latgal nation the amount of use of the language does not exceed 3%. It should be noted that ethnic minorities demonstrate a greater degree of assimilation into Latvian society through the Latvian language than found among the Russian population. According to our data, the representatives of all ethnic minority groups highly appreciate the significance of the Latvian language in the community and actively express their motivation to learn and use the language of the titular nation. The differences relate to a significant reduction in the use of the Russian language by Latvians (despite their high level of proficiency in Russian). Also there is a slightly higher proportion that makes use of other European languages among ethnic minority groups, especially among the younger generation.

Linguistic diversity in multicultural and ethnic societies inevitably leads to certain social barriers to communication and discriminatory policies. Linguistic discrimination as a social problem causes anxiety in 27.6% Latvians, 74.9% Russians, and 56.8% in the rest of the ethnic groups. However, the threat of extinction of the Latvian nation and the Latvian language as the catalysts of ethnic conflict does not exceed 20% of all respondents regardless of nationality.

In general, the institutional hegemony of the Latvian language and linguistic assimilation cause a sense of concern among members of ethnic minorities and serve as the reason for ethnic conflicts and migration. Cultural identity as an ethnic identity in Latvia has a distinctly conservative character. Multicultural identity has a significant level of homogenization, internal cohesion, and self- defense for distancing itself from other social groups. According to our research, the ethnic groups in Latvia have a high degree of cultural identity, while cross-cultural communication based on cultural pluralism and social dialogue is scarce. Moreover, the dominant ethnocultural community of the titular nation has all the institutional and ideological re-

sources for ethnic and cultural hegemony and assimilation. According to a majority of Latvian respondents, ethnic minorities should send their children to Latvian schools and kindergartens, support Latvian cultural organizations, and accept Latvian traditions and other cultural values. Moreover, teaching in schools should be conducted in Latvian. In this regard, the survey reveals the attitudes of respondents to the prospect of future development of the culture of ethnic minorities. 26.0% Latvians, 4.9% Russians and 10.4% of other minorities believe that the culture of Russian and other national minorities in Latvia in the future **will** dissolve in the Latvian culture.

This analysis of attitudes regarding the division of social and ethnic groups and significant cultural symbols also allows us to give a partial picture of a divided ethnic and cultural identity in Latvia. On the questions: "Who is your national hero?" (Lachplesis, Karlis Ulmanis, Vladimir Lenin, Vladimir Putin, Medvedev), and "Who is your national writer?" (Janis Rainis, Francis Trasuns, Alexander Pushkin, Taras Shevchenko, Adam Mickiewicz, Yakub Kolas, and Shalom Aleichem) replies were received that demonstrate the fundamental differences in the existing ethno-cultural communities.

Cultural and value-based separation is an obstacle to the conciliation and tolerance of ethnic policy. Based on our research, it can be concluded that in Latvia there is a strong cultural divide between the ethnic majority and the minorities with a mutually repelling orientation to multicultural integration.

Ethnic conflict: causes and extent of leakage

An important attribute of the analysis of inter-ethnic conflict is to identify the sources and causes of these conflicts. However, tracking the causes of ethnic conflicts faces a

Table 6.2. Ethnocultural identity in Latvia by nationalities (%)				
Question: What language do you speak at home?				
Question: Is there a threat of extinction of the Latvian nation and the national language?				
Question: To what extent are you concerned about the problem of language discrimination in Latvia?				
Question: Do you think that Latvians want to take revenge from Russian and other ethnic groups?				
Question: What, in your opinion, the social characteristics of a person are crucial in Latvia?				
Question: What will happen in the future with the culture of ethnic minorities in Latvia?				
Question: Who are your national hero and a writer?				
Question: What, in your opinion, it is necessary to make the non-Latvians to improve inter-ethnic relations in Latvia?				

Variables	Nationalities			
	Total	Latvians	Russians	Other
Speaks Latvian in family	51.3	92.7	7.3	13.4
Speaks Russian in family	46.6	5.6	91.2	80.6
Speaks Latgal in family	0.6	0.4	0.2	3.0
The threat of extinction of the Latvian nation	16.7	15.6	19.0	14.2
The threat of extinction Latvian language	18.2	16.3	21.7	15.7
The threat of extinction of the people of Latgale	36.6	28.3	35.3	44.8
The threat of extinction of Latgal language	33.5	35.8	51.2	52.7
Language discrimination	48.7	27.6	74.9	56.8
The dominance of ethnicity	61.4	58.0	66.6	59.0
ethnic revenge	44.7	24.9	67.3	57.5
Culture ethno-minorities in the future dissolve in Latvian culture	16.2	26.0	4.9	10.4
Learn the Latvian language	86.6	96.6	75.6	78.4
Send children to Latvian schools and kindergartens	46.1	63.1	28.8	27.6
Teaching in schools in the Latvian language	35.9	64.7	5.4	11.9
Support the Latvian cultural organizations	38.9	58.8	16.6	24.6
Follow Latvian traditions and cultural values	55.4	72.8	33.6	50.0
Lachplesis	49.0	75.4	20.2	26.1
K.Ulmanis	26.0	43.0	7.1	13.4
Vladimir Lenin	4.5	2.0	7.6	5.2
I.Stalin	2.8	1.1	5.3	2.0
V. Putin	17.2	2.7	33.7	27.6
D. Medvedev	18.8	2.1	26.3	24.0
J.Rainis	52.0	76.4	23.4	38.1
F.Trasun	5.4	6.7	3.4	6.7
A. Pushkin	43.6	13.5	79.8	58.2
T.Shevchenko	8.3	3.4	11.4	18.7
A.Mickiewicz	4.2	2.5	3.7	12.6
Y. Kolas	3.9	2.7	3.1	11.2
Sh.Aleyhm	3.9	2.0	4.6	9.7

Note: This table contains only positive responses ("very attached" and "more attached", "totally agree" and "agree").

number of difficulties due to their species diversity, and the absence of clear bounda-ries between a number visible on the surface and the deeper reasons, rooted in the sphere of mentality and cultural attributes. Each conflict (or a series of conflicts) is unique, and it is characterized by its intrinsic set of components and their specific combination. Hence, any attempt to introduce an explanatory diagram of the ethnic conflict on the basis of a number of hypothetical causal statements or, on the contra-ry, verified findings will initially be inaccurate and incomplete.

Thus, the typical causes of ethnic conflicts among experts and representatives of the mass consciousness in Latvia indicate ethnic origin and language of the titular nation, attitudes to the historical past and its interpretation, and the fear of modern Russia. In order to determine possible causes and degree of the flow of ethnic con-flicts in Latvia, the survey included several questions to the respondents, providing a formalization of the responses. To the question: "To what extent are you concerned about ..." ethnic conflicts in Latvia, 27.8% of Latvians responded positively, among Russian 36.6%, and members of other groups 41.0%. Table 6.3 shows the possible confrontation between the ethnic majority and the ethnic minorities. As can be seen from table 6.3, the majority of respondents do not consider ethnic confrontation pos-sible.

Table 6.3. Ethno-political conflicts in Latvia (in%).				
Question: Today in Latvia there are different ethnic groups. What is your opinion about a possible confrontation between the two groups? Please identify on a scale of 1 to 5 the extent to which this confrontation possible.*				
Confrontation is possible			Confrontation is unlikely	
3.2	11.7	26.1	28.0	29.8

Note: *The table presents only positive answers: "Confrontation is possible," "Con-frontation is unlikely."

Only a small part of the respondents (mainly from the non-titular nation), are oriented to overt physical collision. Basically, according to the respondents, in case of a possible confrontation there will be only acute oral exchange (43.3%).

Table 6.4. The causes of ethnic confrontation (in %).				
Question: In your opinion, what are the reasons for this confrontation, to what extent? Please use a scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means - to a large extent, and "5" means - in a small extent. (One answer in each row). *				
Variables	**To a great extent**			**To a small extent**
Economic inequality groups	20.6	21.7	24.8	16.3	16.6
Political group inequality	27.5	24.3	24.9	11.6	11.7
Economic crisis	21.9	24.0	23.1	14.0	17.1
The threat of assimilation	12.7	22.2	29.0	19.9	16.2
The power struggle between the elites of ethnic groups	25.6	24.1	21.5	14.8	14.0
Lack of citizenship	23.6	19.0	24.3	18.6	14.5
The influence of Russia	16.3	17.4	27.4	16.6	22.2

Note: The table includes only positive answers: "To a great extent," "To a small extent."

An analysis of the causes of ethnic conflict in Latvia is presented in table 6.4. Possible causes of ethnic conflicts in Latvia include: economic and political inequalities of ethnic groups, economic crises, the threat of assimilation, the power struggle between the elites of ethnic groups, lack of citizenship, and the impact of Russia. The data show that the hypothetical set of causes of ethnic conflicts sufficiently expresses the position of half of the respondents. Moreover, the lack of citizenship and the influence of Russia as causes of ethnic conflicts were indicated twice as much by Russian and other ethnic minorities than by Latvians, which was to be expected.

Discussion and conclusion

Ethnic stratification and inequality in Latvia

The peculiarity of ethnic politics in a multiethnic Latvia since independence is a constant search for effective ways and means of the incorporation of ethnic groups into the titular nation. The formally proclaimed ideology of equality and social integration by the Latvian ruling elite (the largest interest in which is detected sporadically in times of national and regional elections) was completely discredited through assimilation processes by 2013.

Ethno-political inequality and subordination in the distribution of power, privileges, and resources resulted in modern ethnic stratification. Note that the borders and internal structure of ethno stratification in Latvia are so far not completely finished.

Horowitz (1985) proposes to distinguish between societies that are vertically separated from societies that horizontally stratified. We may well agree with the findings of the Latvian researchers led by B. Zepa that it would be wrong to consider the ethnic situation in Latvia stable and unchanging. This finding is a result of the study "Ethno-political tensions in Latvia: the search for ways to resolve the conflict" (Zepa 2005).

The empirical basis for these conclusions is general demographic data, the study of labor based on the CSB and data polls. According to the authors, in Latvia there are certain areas where Latvians dominate (public administration, education, agriculture), and there are areas with a higher proportion of non-Latvians (transport, industry, construction). However, significant differences in the incomes of Latvians, Russians and other nationalities are not observed. What helps to ease the risk factors

of ethnic conflict, as suggested by Zepa, can be attributed to the fact that in Latvia ethnic groups are not concentrated homogeneously in concrete regions and economic industries. These groups are represented in various fields and scattered across different regions, forming a reticular mixed model according to Rothschild (1981/1985).

The final conclusion by the research team of Zepa is that in the case of Latvia, the situation where every ethnic group is represented in various activities and there are no significant differences in income by ethnicity, this is considered as a factor that reduces the possibility of an escalation of the ethnic conflict. Recognition of ethnic conflict and its inclusion into scientific and political rhetoric in most cases cause extremely hostile reactions, criticisms of being unscientific and lack of loyalty to the regime. The Latvian political elite, demographically, socially, and intellectually does not represent the Latvian society since it only makes up less than one percent of the total population, possessing all the resource capabilities of ethnic mobilization. Absolute ethnic hegemony (over 90%) characterizes the bureaucratic class, national authorities, and regional government. A significant portion of the national budget is allocated for the maintenance of Latvian bureaucracy. The lack of political representation of ethnic minorities in power and control are not only a barrier to expression and the protection of their interests, but also is the reason for the deficit of representative democracy in Latvia.

National identity as a conflict-generating resource in Latvia

At the first approach to the phenomenon of ethnic and cultural identity in Latvia, there is confusion about the need for any new empirical data, the detection and assessment of what is happening. At the same time, there is need for constant monitoring of Latvian ethno-political relations and dynamics of growing ethno-conflicts in intensive European territorial mobility and the crisis of European multiculturalism.

"Sleeping" conflicts and ethnic "frozen" ethnic relations, with their inherent oppositional oral historical memory in Soviet Latvia, were transformed into an open confrontation in the post-Soviet period. At present Latvia steadily has established the dominant ethno-cultural identity of the titular nationality and ethnic minorities. An intense and painful period in the 1990s of searching and finding new regime identities is over, but the political formula of Latvian statehood has become – "ethno-cultural and ethnic plurality in a single whole."

Despite the proclaimed democratic principles and the public rhetoric of ethno-cultural tolerance and integration of the power elite, ethnic minorities have been effectively "deduced" from the role of policy-making positions. Tracking the regulatory changes in the Latvian ethnic policies, one can argue about their introduction and implementation as a result of the expectations and influences (and sometimes sanctions) of external structures and political actors, in particular the European Union and Russia.

In the case of the Baltic countries, the existence of the Baltic Russians and other ethnic groups, with their particular ethno-cultural identities are sufficient reason for the recognition of their special rights, as well as a natural condition for the democratic development of these political regimes.

A major finding of our study is that ethnic majority and subordinated ethnic minorities in Latvia identify themselves with the identities of "different worlds" that the resulting in the ethno-political and cultural conflict. Factor analysis has identified the existence of sustainable and high correlations between the variables of ethnicity, language, culture and national symbols. The high ethno-cultural self-identity of national and ethnic groups in Latvia is also characterized by stable ethnic relations and group cohesion. Survey data generally show a decline of ethnic bias and prejudice

together with hostile attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Respondents' perceptions about the disappearance of the Latvian nation, culture and language, as well as national revenge as commonplaces of stereotypes are not statistically significant, and contrary to the assertions of the power elite.

Conclusion

The general conclusion that can be drawn as the result of the conceptual approaches and empirical findings of our study, as well as in the detection of civil involvement in social and political life, gives evidence of the existence of two fundamentally divided political and ethno-cultural communities in the institutional dominance of the titular nation.

The integrative resources in society appear completely exhausted, and the rhetoric of social integration itself (imposed from the outside as one of the conditions of European integration) causes irritation and only vague associations. Perceptions of political community (otherwise, relating to the state) that were rather optimistically shared by the majority of Latvia's population by the end of the 1990s were completely devalued by 2013. Attributes of the Latvian state and its recognizable markers, as well as the ideology of independence, are rapidly leveled out in one pot of market relations, European integration and uncontrolled migration. In the context of the primordial approach of national identity and ethnic conflict, the titular identity is conservative and encapsulated.

Ethnic conflict is not in a phase of open manifestation and is not focused on violent forms of conflict. Orientation to the resistance to the regime and other forms of oppositional struggle to protect their own interests by ethnic minorities is related to the constitutional norms of individual and collective self-expression. The political protest as an expression of democratic values and civic responsibility does not pos-

sess the resource legitimacy of the ruling elite and, in general, is realized only by ethnic minorities. Focus on the resistance to the regime and other forms of oppositional struggle to protect their own interests by ethnic minorities, is related to the constitutional norms of individual and collective self-expression.

The practice of economic and political exclusion of ethnic minorities in Latvia is closely linked to their cultural alienation and cultural status hierarchy. Separation of Russian and other ethnic minorities, ethnicity, language, culture, religion, ethnic homeland, cause from the Latvian government agencies accusations of disloyalty, and leads to a limitation of their political rights and the suppression of ethnic minority cultures. This fact is an obstacle to the democratic development of ethnic and cultural diversity in Latvia through culturally inclusive policies.

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Appendix 6.1. Technical information model of the sample study in 2011

Regions	Demographics (%) (from 18 years)	Total number of respondents to the survey (%)	Total number of survey respondents (%)
Total	100	100	100
1. Riga	34.0	34.6	34.8
2. Vidzeme	22.0	22.3	25.2
-Jurmala			
-Riga region			
- Limbazhi			
- Valmiera			
- Cesis			
- Gulbene			
- Aluksne			
- Valka			
- Madonna			
- Ogre			
3. Kurzeme	11.0	10.8	16.5
- Liepaja			
- Tulsi			
- Ventspils			
- Kuldiga			
- Saldus			
4. Zemgale	17.0	16.8	12.5
- Dobele			
- Tukums			
- Jelgava			
- Bauska			
- Ekabpils			
- Ajzkraukle			
5. Latgale	16.0	15.5	10.8
- Prejli			
- Daugavpils			
- Rezekne			
- Ludzas			
- Balvi			
- Kraslava			

Stratification parameters	Demographics (%) (from18 years)	Total number of respondents to the survey (%)	Total number of survey respondents (%)
Male/Female			
Total	100	100	100
Man	46.3	46.3	42.1
Woman	53.7	53.7	57.9
Nationality			
Total	100	100	100
Latvians	57.7	57.7	50.6
Russians	30.0	30.0	37.2
Others	12.3	12.3	12.2
Age of respondents			
Total	100	100	100
18-24 y.	16.4	17.4	15.6
25-34	18.8	18.0	25.6
35-44	21.5	21.2	19.9
45-54	18.1	18.6	18.1
more than 55	24.2	24.7	20.8
Status			
Total	100	100	100
Working	63.5	63.6	69.4
Unemployed	36.5	36.4	30.6
Education			
Total	100	100	100
Elementary	11.6	11.5	2.0
Average	69.5	69.6	51.0
High School	18.9	18.9	46.2
Citizenship			
Total	100	100	100
Citizens of Latvia	74.2	73.8	82.2
Non-citizens	25.8	26.2	17.8

Note: The table in Appendix 6.1 shows only the positive data.

Chapter 7

Diversity Management and Sustainability:
The Latvian Case in Baltic Context

Juris Rozenvalds[1]

The idea of sustainable development today is understood not only in relation to re-
sources and the environment but also in relation to people's ability to arrange their
lives so that economic and social sustainability is achieved.   Contemporary societies
are becoming increasingly varied and, in this context, a crucial component to the so-
cial political sustainability is the ability to ensure the unity of society, respecting va-
riety, supporting pluralism and opportunities for participation (United Nations,
2012).

The stability and consolidation processes of multiethnic societies depend on
several factors, among them, we will single out as the most important the power and
historical ties to the society; distance between ethnic cultures and languages; rela-
tionship between the kinds of their information space; the similar/different in the his-
torical memories of the titular ethnos and non-titular communities and their related
group identities; demographic factors (settlement traditions, percentage of mixed
marriages); and social and economic differences between the titular ethnos and non-
titular communities.   Finally, we should mention the political factors: both the inter-
nal—actions of the ruling political elites and relationships among the political repre-
sentatives of communities—and the external—the influence of international organi-

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zations and allied countries, as well as the influence of the historic homeland of the non-titular community, particularly if it is located next door.

The Soviet legacy in Latvia's demographic situation and mutual relationships of ethnic communities gives rise to a contradictory picture. On the one hand, as a result of a whole row of circumstances, Latvia had suffered most compared to its Baltic "sisters". Postwar migration processes led Latvians close to the brink of becoming a minority in their historical territory. According to the 1989 USSR Census data, Latvians were only 52% of the total population of Latvia and were a minority in all the largest cities compared with 75% in 1935. On the other hand, if we are to compare Latvia to Estonia (for a variety of reasons, the demographic situation in Lithuania developed along substantially different lines), a more favorable situation formed in Latvia at the end of the 1980s, which, in many aspects, has persisted to this day.

Even though the proportion of Russian speakers in Estonia is only slightly smaller than in Latvia (24.8% to 27%), Latvia had a substantially larger percentage of so-called "old Russians" most of whom were citizens of the Republic of Latvia already before the war and who were aware of their ties to Latvia, by and large separating themselves from postwar immigrants. Overall, the Russian-speaking community in Latvia, compared to those in Estonia and Lithuania, is characterized by the relatively highest feeling of its power and social influence. If we are to express the self-assessment of a group on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is a total lack of influence and 1, a totally dominating influence, the self-assessment of Latvia's Russian speakers is 0.51, which is higher than that of Russian speakers in Lithuania (0.49) and Estonia (0.45) (Ehala & Zabrodskaja, 2011, 30).

Enumerating the differences between Latvia and Estonia, we should definitely mention the different traditions of settlement of non-titular ethnoses. In Estonia, the

Russian speaking population is concentrated primarily in the northeastern part of Estonia where Russians are a majority. In Latvia, by contrast, non-Latvians, including Russians, are more evenly distributed throughout the territory of the country. We must note also that the Russian speakers in Estonia are more separated from the titular nation than in Latvia, not only geographically but also socially. On the one hand, it is closely related to the aforementioned settlement traditions. One third of Estonia's Russian speakers live in the northeast of the country, which in the post-socialist Estonia has become a depressed region. In Estonia, a much larger difference in wages persists between the representatives of the Russian-speaking community and the titular nation than in Latvia (Hazans 2010, 142-143).

In the literature of the social sciences, the indicator of the percentage of mixed marriages tends to be singled out in the context of relations between ethno-linguistic groups: it is viewed as an essential characteristic of the "social distance" between ethnic groups, because mixed marriages involve not only individuals but also wider social groups to which the individuals belong. In Latvia in the postwar period, the number of mixed marriages was traditionally relatively high during the Soviet time; Latvia was in the first place among the republics of the Soviet Union republics. In Latvia the number of mixed marriages has not substantially changed with the restoration of independence, hovering around 20% in the last forty years. Moreover, the percentage of Russians marrying Latvians has increased substantially from 16% at the beginning of the 1990s to 25% less than fifteen years later (Monden 2005, 334), which, apparently can be explained by the fact that during the mass exodus from Latvia at the beginning of the 1990s, the part of the Russian-speaking population that least intended to integrate with the Latvian society and culture was the one that left.

Despite successes of politics of russification in Latvia, compared to Estonia, there was and still is a higher percentage of Russian-speaking residents, who have a

command of the language of the titular nation. Thus, according to the 1979 census results, 20.1% of non-Latvians knew the language of the indigenous population of their republic, whereas only 13.0% of the non-Estonians knew Estonian (Misiunas 1993, 283). This difference increased even in the twenty years of restored independence. According to the results of the 2000 census, 37.4% of non-Estonians had a command of Estonian as a second language. In Latvia, the proportion of speakers of Latvian as a second language was 59.5% of non-Latvians (Statistical Office of Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania, 2003, 37). From the point of view of social integration, it is fundamentally important to take into account the fact that the bilingual segment of the society is substantially larger in Latvia than in Lithuania or Estonia. According to the data of M. Ehala, such a segment is constituted of about 18% of the population in Lithuania and Estonia, whereas in Latvia it exceeds 40% (Ehala 2012).

Concluding this brief overview of the significant factors in the context of integration, let us turn into a very important (yet most difficult to measure and identify) issue of the identities of ethno-linguistic groups and their mutual relationships. The post-socialist collective identity in Latvia was substantially influenced by two persistent attitudes that we will designate here as "trauma" and a "hope for a return". For Latvia and Latvians, such trauma was the experience of occupation, mass repression, deportations, ideological pressures, and massive immigration and russification processes. Under the conditions of post-socialist transformations, the social discomfort was exacerbated by the rapid changes in social structure, unemployment, cost of living, and uncertainty about the future. We should note that in Latvia, similar to several other East European countries, turning to history as a strategy of surviving "trauma", which often turns to reopening old wounds, has become an integral component of the social- political discourse. Moreover, in the Latvian collective consciousness of

recent decades the "vicious circle of cultural destruction", as Piotr Sztompka (2000, 464) calls it, has become rather pronounced. It is characterized by attempts to choose the cultivation of memories as a strategy that maintains or even exacerbates the trauma syndrome. Such an approach is evident in the attempts to resolve the internal problems of society and establishing relationships with other countries by choosing to be guided by the need to overcome past injustices. It shows itself as idealization of prewar Latvia, a black-and-white view of the Soviet period, identification of leftist and Russian, as well as attempts to make the collective responsibility of the Soviet regime for the occupation, Sovietization, and Russification of Latvia a matter of individual responsibility of current postwar immigrants and their offspring. Here, we must mention minority complex as a persistent characteristic of the Latvian collective consciousness (Ščerbinskis 2004). Its roots can be found in the centuries-long experience of being in a minority subjected to various alien powers, including the almost five decades as a part of the USSR.

It is also asserted that "a couple of Latvian generations have grown up with a minority complex, whereas the generations of immigrants have grown up with a feeling of impunity and dominance" (Ščerbinskis 2004). Latvian low self-image was also discussed in the research paper of the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, "Society Integration and Tolerance in Latvia" (2004), which concluded that "Latvians are characterized by a sense of endangerment because Latvians in their country … feel as an endangered majority" (Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2004, 12).

According to the data presented by M. Ehala and A. Zabrodskaja, Latvian self-assessment (0.66) is substantially lower than that of Lithuanians (0.74) and Estonians (0.72). Similar differences exist also in regard to the titular nation by the relevant Russian-speaking minorities. Lithuanians have the highest evaluation (0.78), they are followed by Estonians (0.74), and finally Latvians (0.70) (Ehala & Zabrodskaja 2011,

30). Also in terms of the relative ethnic potential of titular groups (which is calculated, comparing the self-assessment of the titular nation with the ethnic potential of the Russian-speaking minority in its evaluation) Latvians afford themselves a very slight upper hand over Latvia's Russian speakers (0.10), substantially lagging behind the Estonians (0.23) and Lithuanians (0.20) (ibid.). Of course, it is debatable to what extent such self-assessment is commensurable with the undeniable fact that Latvians have dominated Latvia's political life over the past twenty years, but in this case, the state of collective consciousness becomes a fact of social life.

The minority complex is reflected also in an exclusive political culture rooted in conviction common within the public and the political elites alike that postwar immigrants have no right to make decisions on issues that are strategically important to Latvia's development. At the beginning of the 1990s, 52% of Latvians were of the opinion that only prewar citizens and their offspring should take part in elections of the restored state. To compare, only 44% Estonians and a mere 12% Lithuanians shared this opinion, which is a clear indication of the relation between the degree of "cultural trauma" (which in this case is inversely proportional to the percentage of the titular nation in total population) and support for exclusive political culture (Rose & Maley 1994). Such orientation of everyday consciousness turned out to be very viable. In a 2013 survey of Latvian citizens, 60.3% of the Latvian respondents agreed with the statement that minority identities and cultures should be supported and reinforced. Yet only 37.5% of the Latvian respondents agreed with the statement that Latvia's development would be promoted by a more active participation of non-Latvians in state governance (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2013).

Another dominant feature of Latvian post-socialist consciousness could be referred to as "the hope for a return", the widespread conviction that after close to fifty years spent in the USSR, Latvia belongs to where it once belonged, i.e. in the Western

world. The hope of returning to Europe became a very powerful consolidation factor for society at large but particularly its Latvian part. Because of it, many were ready to make certain sacrifices, but on the other hand it also meant openness to pressures from the West (Muižnieks & Brands Kehris 2003). True, it must be taken into account that the return to Europe is determined by two interrelated yet distinct factors. First, it is the transformation of legislative norms and political institutions in conformity with the so-called Copenhagen criteria, i.e. requirements that were formulated vis-à-vis EU candidates at the meeting of the Council of Europe in 1993 in Copenhagen. To become members of the European club, they had to establish a legal and institutional framework of democracy; ensure observation of human and minority rights; develop a viable market economy that could survive the pressure of the EU common market as well as take on the obligation to move toward a closer political, economic, and monetary union. In fact, that meant to create the formal framework to the preconditions of democracy, which could not, however, guarantee the formation of a democratic political culture.

Although observance of minority rights is mentioned in the Copenhagen criteria as one of the most important preconditions of the integration process, its particular framework remains undefined, given the diversity of approaches within the EU. The establishment of a truly democratic culture within wide strata of the population, which, in turn, is a fundamental precondition of sustained democracy, requires much deeper (and requiring longer time) changes in the basic attitudes of the society and the basic characterizations of the political process, making them conform to the spirit of European humanist traditions. That is "Europeization" in the true sense of the word, and in this respect, Latvia still has a long way to go. Moreover, from now on it will much more depend on the choices made by society itself and the political elites – both because there are no universal prescriptions for establishing consolidated de-

mocracy, and because, with Latvia joining the European Union and NATO, the ability of our allies to influence our internal politics have substantially diminished.

In contrast to the Latvian identity, the self-identification of Latvia's Russian speaking population formed within a different cultural tradition. As far as Russians as the core of Latvia's Russian-speaking community are concerned, it was the historical experience of the great nation, which associated itself with powerful, despotic statehood (originally, the Russian Empire, later its heir, the Soviet Union). During the last years of Soviet power, as well as during the Singing Revolution, the majority of Latvia's Russian speakers were bearers of "normal" awareness: they felt that they belonged to the politically and culturally dominant part of the society, and in their scale of values, social and economic priorities dominated over the specifically ethnic ones (for instance, the use of the native language in social communication and education), because the observance of the latter seemed "normal" and self-evident. A kind of "normalcy momentum" formed that could be more pronounced for Latvia's Russian speakers if for only the reason that after the war they enjoyed a more comfortable situation than in the other two Baltic republics.

The dominance of social and economic priorities in the collective consciousness of Latvia's Russian speakers also meant that the possible regaining of Latvia's independence was perceived with hope for a more rapid socioeconomic development, which was not in conflict with the desire of Latvians to restore their statehood as a precondition for the sustainability of their language and culture. The above circumstances were of essence on Latvia's road to the restoration of independence. According to public opinion surveys, in 1990, independence for Latvia was supported by 39% of local non-Latvians (Zepa 1992). The poll on national independence, which, at the beginning of 1991 was conducted in Latvia in contrast to the referendum on preserving the Soviet Union conceived by the then leaders of the USSR, the propor-

tion of eligible population that voted for national independence (64.51%) substantially exceeded (by about 12%) the proportion of Latvians in the total population (52.05%, according to the 1989 census data). That provides grounds for the assertion that a significant portion of non-Latvians – at least 25% – at the March 3, 1991 poll, voted for Latvia's independence. In terms of this indicator, Latvia surpassed Lithuania where the proportion of those voting for independence was about the same as the proportion of Lithuanians in the total population, and it also surpassed Estonia where the number of those voting for independence was only a couple of percentage points higher than the proportion of Estonians in the total population of Estonia. These data invite the conclusion that the support for the independence idea among minorities was greater in Latvia than in Lithuania and Estonia.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian-speaking population of Latvia also ended up in a cultural trauma situation, even though the reasons were substantially different. It was caused by rapid socioeconomic change and change in their previous social standing, which was furthered by the fact that the dominant attitudes to language and citizenship questions became stricter after 1991 when compared to the rules (admittedly, also promises) at the time of the Singing Revolution, and it was stricter in regard to several fundamental issues, than the attitudes in Estonia, not even speaking of Lithuania. In the first half of the 1990s, almost one third of Latvia's population (including about two thirds of Russians) did not enjoy full political rights. The Russian speakers in Latvia quickly lost their normalcy illusions and began regarding themselves as a minority that has to fight for its rights. It is still a debatable and politically very sensitive question to what degree in this process privileges were lost that were established during Soviet time and to what extent the nationalization process involved infringing upon the inalienable rights of non-Latvians.

However, it is indisputable that in Latvia, a potentially dangerous confrontation arose between two minority consciousnesses, which in global history often have had devastating consequences. We must note that, according to the data of M. Ehala and A. Zabrodskaja, the small minorities of the Baltics (Lithuanian Russians and Poles), assess the legitimacy of the inter-ethnic relationships in their country with grades above average (3.77 and 3.90 points, respectively) on a 6 point scale where 1 equals low and 6 high legitimacy. The large minorities, the Russian speakers of Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, give the legitimacy of these relationships a much lower evaluation: 2.78 and 2.31 points, respectively. In Latvia one can also find the highest level of mutual distrust between ethnic groups in the Baltic countries. Latvians give it 3.29 points, which is substantially higher than the Estonian 3.06 and Lithuanian 2.76 points. A similar picture emerges with Latvia's Russian speakers who assess the mutual distrust with a 3.37, which substantially differs from the assessments of Lithuanian and Estonian Russian speakers (respectively, 2.76 and 3.16) (Ehala & Zabrodska 2011, 36).

Because of limits of space, we will not discuss in detail the role played by internal factors (resistance of Russian speakers to nationalization attempts; the often inflexible policies of the Latvian state in the area of language, citizenship, and civic participation of minorities etc.) and Russia's policies with respect to compatriots in the near abroad. We must note, however, that susceptibility to external influences is usually explained by the internal problems of a society.

Flows and ebbs of integrations policies in Latvia

To what extent did the Latvian leadership manage to use the historically formed opportunities for consolidation of Latvian society and its stabilization on sustainable

foundations and to prevent or at least mitigate the undesirable dissociation trend between the communities?

Evaluating the experience of the last twenty-five years in the area of integration policies, several basic features stand out. Let us begin by noting that a fundamental difference exists between the achievements of spontaneous "from the bottom" integration and the obvious skidding of the official integration and consolidation policies. In the last twenty-five years, no consensus has formed either among the political elites or in society at large with regard to the need for integration, its methods and desired results. As a result, integration policies over the past twenty-five years have always been the "unloved child" of the Latvian political elite, with flows followed by ebbs, and activation taking place mostly because of external pressure, although the source and direction keep shifting substantially over time.

During the Singing Revolution, the proliferation of integration ideas was promoted by the pressure of pro-imperial forces from the central structures of the USSR and the pressure from their supporters within Latvia. Given the ethnic composition of the then Latvian society, the necessity to address the Russian-speaking part of the society and seek out opportunities for mutual cooperation seemed self-evident. This approach was expressed most clearly by the first-generation leaders of the Latvian Popular Front (LPF), which was the most influential national democratic organization at the time of the Awakening.

At that time, supporters of the "legal" method of restoring independence came onto the political stage, assembling in the Citizens Congress of the Republic of Latvia. They considered all postwar immigrants illegal and therefore the very question of society integration seemed secondary: the first order of business for them was reinstating the rights of the citizens of the prewar Republic of Latvia and their de-

scendants. At the end of the summer of 1991, the situation was very favorable for the restoration of independence of the Baltic states: Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to save the USSR from collapsing by means of signing the new Union treaty failed and the defeat of the August coup d'état meant a radical weakening of the USSR hardliners both in Latvia and Moscow. The burden of reality seemed to have been lifted from the shoulders of Latvian politicians, and many of those who, at the beginning of the year, were inviting non-Latvians to vote in a referendum on Latvia's independence, promising them citizenship in independent Latvia fast became supporters of the "legal" approach. On October 15, 1991, the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on renewing the body of citizens of the Republic of Latvia, leaving the regulation of the citizenship status of postwar immigrants for some later date, which came only four years later. Without making slight of the significance of legal succession and the need to restore the body of citizens of the Republic of Latvia, we have to admit that the opportunity was lost to develop closer ties to the renewed Latvian state by at least that part of the Russian speakers, who supported the idea of Latvia's independence during the Awakening period.

During the first years of restored independence, Latvia did not have a unified integration policy. In Latvian society and among the political elites of the time, there was a widely held conviction that the resolution of Latvian and non-Latvian relationships was to be found in the emigration of non-Latvians to the lands of their ancestors, primarily to Russia. Subsequent years showed, however, that most of the Russian speakers in Latvia and the other two Baltic countries did not seem to have much of a desire to follow the Russian military personnel and their families.   At the same time, sociological research of the 1990s pointed to substantial differences between the values and attitudes of the Latvian and Russian-speaking parts of the society (Baltijas Datu nams 1997).

The theme of integration came to the foreground of the political agenda in relation to Latvia's desire to join the European political structures and the 1997-1998 crisis in its relations with Russia. In this regard, parallel to vigorously expressed solidarity, Latvia also had to experience an as yet unknown pressure from its partners in the West, whose aim was to encourage the Latvian political elite to take measures to consolidate its society, otherwise threatening to leave Latvia without political support from the West. As a result of this pressure, the Law on Citizenship was amended in 1998, and work was begun on the basic principles of state policies in the area of society integration. In 1999, the conceptual draft of the state program "Society Integration in Latvia" was published for public review, and at the beginning of 2001—overriding nationalist resistance—the program was approved by the government.

The next ebb in integration policies came together with the end of the years of plenty. This setback was promoted by pressure from politicians skeptically inclined toward integration in combination with the skepticism of the social partners of the government, which to a great extent reflected the opinion of the broader public. In the fall of 2008, using the economizing of finances as an excuse, it was resolved to abolish the separate state structure responsible for integration issues and to cut financing allotted for carrying out of these functions.

The third wave of interest in issues regarding society consolidation came to pass with the Saeima elections of 2010 and – in contrast to the previous two flows – its causes were found domestically: they came from the consolidation of the political representatives of Russian speakers and growing electoral success (28 mandates out of 100 in 2010, and 31 mandates in 2011).

The state policies of Latvian state have not been consistent up to now. Success in one area usually was followed by the endeavors of the nationalistically inclined part of the political elite to achieve reciprocity in some other area. The most striking example here are the amendments to the Education Law, which, after the positive results of the October 3, 1998 Referendum on Amendments to the Law on Citizenship, the 6th Saeima adopted on the last day of its authority, providing for education in the state language in state and local educational establishments as of 2004. Six years later, implementing this legal provision caused mass protests by the Russian speakers and had serious consequences in areas not directly related to education issues, for instance, the civic activity of the Russian-speaking community increased in close connection with these protests and the degree of its organization grew – an effect that was unexpected and unpleasant to the Latvian political elite. From a politically relatively amorphous mass it became a well organized political force.

Finally, another feature of the hitherto conducted integration policies by the Latvian state, which is directly related to its failures: the pronounced paternalism, i.e. the tendency to resolve minority related issues without the participation of minorities themselves.

As we mentioned above, twenty years ago there were generally more favorable preconditions for society integration in Latvia than in neighboring Estonia. After twenty years of independence, we have to conclude that the situation in Estonia developed in a direction that was more favorable to the state than in Latvia. More favorable trends in Estonia are observed in the transformation of the identity of Russian speakers. As noted by the Estonian researcher Triin Vhalemm, the Estonian Russians, after twenty years of Baltic independence, are more likely to regard self-determination in transnational and civic forms. In this connection, the generally pro-western orientation of the Estonian Russians is observed in contrast to the basically

pro-eastern orientation of the Russians in Latvia. In recent years, according to Estonian researchers, there is a tendency in Estonia of homogenization of the political culture of the Estonian majority and Russian speaking minority based on values of consumer society, gains from participation in the European Union, and an increase in the use of the Internet (Vihalemm 2002). Yet there is still a great degree of separation between the communities, which may result in further segregation of the Russian-speaking community.

Table 7.1. Support for Russian parties in Estonian and Latvian parliament elections (1992-2011. Percent)											
	1992	1993	1995	1998	1999	2002	2003	2006	2007	2010	2011
Estonia	boycotted		5.9		2.0		2.44		1.2		0.9
Latvia		10.0*	12.4	14.1		20.1		22.5		27.5	29.1

Sources: Data of the Estonian and Latvian Central Electoral Committees (Estonian National Electoral Committee, n.d.; Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija, n.d.).

Note: *Approximate calculation, taking into account the schism in the "Saskaṇa Latvijai" fraction of the 5th Saeima.

In contrast to Latvia, the degree of political consolidation of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia is low; the majority of Estonian Russian-speaking citizens in parliament elections vote for the "Center Party" led by the former Popular Front leader Edgar Savisaar, which, despite its dubious association with the ruling "United Russia" party of Russia, enjoys respect in a substantial part of the Estonian society and has participated in ruling coalitions. The influence of Russian parties in Estonian politics keeps dropping from one election to the next, Table 7.1.

Without delving into an analysis of the mechanisms of the Estonian political landscape, it must be noted that these processes were substantially influenced by the greater (at least, compared to Latvia) opportunities for political participation on the part of the Russian-speaking minority, including non-citizens. This concerns the right of Estonian non-citizens to vote in local elections. The OSCE recommended this

measure to Estonia and Latvia already in the early 1990s. Estonia was forced to take this step in a situation where there arose a real possibility that a referendum might be organized on separation of north-eastern Estonia from the rest of the country. Yet, in reaching a compromise regarding the issue of voting rights for non-citizens, albeit made under duress, Estonia turned out to be the winner in the long term. In Latvia, on the other hand, the splitting of the political spectrum by ethnicity; increasing electoral support to the "Russian parties" from one election to the next; the inability to find a cooperation model between the Latvian and Russian parties, as well as relegating the Russian-speaking political representatives in perpetual opposition are giving rise to ever more pronounced negative consequences with respect to sociopolitical processes in society at large. First, we should mention an unavoidable decrease in political competition, which has created instability in the work of governments and become a substantial obstacle in carrying out consistent, strategically-oriented policies.

The narrow circle of political forces forming governments and the lack of a real alternative capable of forming a government inevitably lead to the irreplaceability of some political forces and their disproportional influence on government decisions. The low level of political competition is mentioned also as one of the main reasons for the relatively high level of corruption, which, in the assessment of international organizations, has been traditionally higher than in Estonia and Lithuania. In the first decade of the 21st century, administrative corruption has diminished in Latvia, whereas political institutions, e.g., political parties, in the evaluation of the Global Corruption Barometer, are largely affected by corruption (Transparency International, 2013). Finally, weak political competition combined with the identification between the "left" and "Russian", seriously limited the formation of a civilized leftist alternative to the right-wing political forces, which have dominated Latvian politics

in the first twenty years of restored independence. That is one of the main reasons for the disproportional growth of socioeconomic inequity in the course of post-socialist transformations, which our neighboring countries have not experienced to such a great extent, not even speaking of such post-communist countries as Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

Quo Vadis, integration of Latvian society?

One of the most characteristic tendencies in Latvian political and intellectual elites of the last decade is an ever greater emphasis on the priority of Latvian ethnic values as the main precondition for sustainable development of society. This is evidenced, for example, by the differences in the formulations of the integration programs of 2001 and 2011. The 2001 formulation of the integration program, while emphasizing the significance of the Latvian language and culture, nevertheless puts civic values at the foreground (State program "Society Integration in Latvia", 2001, 4). "The Basic Tenets of the National Identity, Civic Society, and Integration Policy for 2012-2018" adopted in 2011 is a substantial reconsideration of civic and ethnic values. In the understanding of the authors of this document, society's integration is by and large passed on Latvian ethnic values, and civic participation, instead of being a fundamental precondition for and part of integration processes, but an offshoot of integration (i.e. with the Latvian cultural space) that has already taken place. In this regard, not even discussing to what extent such an approach corresponds to ideas dominating in Europe about the norms and mechanism of society integration, one cannot but doubt whether such an approach is realistic in the circumstances of contemporary Latvian society. We must emphasize that most of Latvian residents, independently of their ethnicity, are convinced of the need to have a knowledge of Latvi-

an and assume that support for Latvian language and culture is one of the funda-
mental tasks of the Latvian state.

In the 2012/2013 survey, the question asked was whether every Latvian citizen
should know Latvian. Despite the fresh memories of the language referendum that
had taken place a year earlier, the respondents of both large ethno-linguistic groups
were united in their view of the necessity for knowledge of Latvian. This was the
opinion of 89.7% among the respondents (97.1% ethnic Latvian and 76.5% ethnic
Russian respondents) (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2013).

Table 7.2. Support for the idea that the foundation of the unity of the Latvian society
is Latvian language and culture, by ethnicity of the respondent. (Percentages of eth-
nic group, aggregated replies "completely agree" and "rather agree than disagree").

Ethnicity	Foundation of unity: Latvian language and culture	
	2010, n=1004	2013, n=1001
Latvians	89.1	90.9
Russians	46.0	43.1
Others	54.5	60.9
All	71.8	73.2

Sources: NI: Human Development Report: Latvia (Faculty of Social Sciences, Universi-
ty of Latvia, 2010); NI: Human Development Report: Latvia (Faculty of Social Scienc-
es, University of Latvia, 2013).

It can be stated without any exaggeration that after twenty years of renewed
independence, Latvian society finds itself at a crossroads where, looking for a way to
guarantee the sustainability of the state and the nation, it must choose between two
entirely realistic scenarios for further development. The first of these has been
mapped out in the 2011 Basic Tenets of Integration with an emphasis on the Latvian
language and culture as the sole foundation for the unity of society. The opinions of
the largest ethno-linguistic communities of Latvia are radically different on this ques-
tion. Moreover, the aggregated data of sociological surveys shown in Table 7.2 indi-
cate that the gap between the Latvian and Russian-speaking parts of the society has a

tendency to widen. It is not clear by what means it could be bridged, if we take into account the obvious rise in the self-confidence and degree of political organization of the Russian-speaking community in recent years. That provides grounds for considering the Basic Tenets of 2011 as a document based on utopian assumptions and to assert that the implementation of the ideas contained therein is likely to lead to a result completely opposite to the expectations of the authors, i.e. to the reinforcement of a two-community society.

Table 7.3 Attitude to civic values by the ethnicity of the respondent							
(% of the respective group; aggregated replies "important" and "very important").							
What does it mean to be a good citizen?	*Observe rules and regulations*		*Pay taxes*		*Be informed about what is happening in the society*		*Participate in elections*	
	2010	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013	2010	2013
	n=1004	n=1001	n=1004	n=1001	n=1004	n=1001	n=1004	n=1001
All	87.1	90.3	77.0	86.0	75.8	86.5	78.9	76.7
Latvians	87.7	90.1	76.6	87.7	77.6	86.3	79.3	78.0
Russians	86.6	88.9	76.7	83.4	71.6	85.8	79.6	77.5
Others	85.7	94.5	80.0	84.5	78.1	89.1	74.4	69.0

Sources: Human Development Report: Latvia (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2010); Human Development Report: Latvia (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2013).

The other scenario is based on the assumption that the foundation of the unity of society is found in an emphasis on civic values; a renewed constructive dialogue between the largest ethno-linguistic communities of Latvia; a widening of civic inclusion of the minorities, and in their full-fledged representation in making decisions important to Latvian society. The data of the surveys of 2010 and 2013 indicate that the attitudes of Latvians and non-Latvians toward civic values are very similar (Table 7.3).

Historical evidence suggests that emphasis on civic values is a rather effective means whereby the state can include and integrate ethnic minorities and—in the longer term—a much more effective means for drawing together the minorities and titular ethnos than forced assimilation measures. In the current context of Latvia, it would create a new, more favourable climate in the relationship between the largest ethnolinguistic communities and thereby promote the role of the Latvian language as the cornerstone of social communication recognized by the majority of the society.

It must be noted that despite the recently increasingly strained interethnic relationships, the potential for compromise has remained relatively high. In the 2013 survey respondents were asked to choose among three scenarios of Latvian ethno-cultural development: the idea of Latvian Latvia that would involve limiting other languages and cultures; the integrative model entailing priority development of the Latvian language and culture while at the same time providing support for the development of other languages and cultures; and, finally, the melting pot model where the relationships between languages and cultures would be formed on the basis of free competition. A substantial majority among the respondents who have an opinion regarding this issue (71.5%) favor the integrative model – a mere 8.8% support the idea of Latvian Latvia, and 19.7% see Latvia's future in a free competition among languages and cultures. Furthermore, moderates among the respondents have an obvious majority both among Latvians and Russians (78.0% and 62.4%, respectively) (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, 2013). In other words, in the general social consciousness, sustainability and a reasonable compromise go hand in hand.

In implementing this scenario a crucial role will be played by the political elites and their ability to refrain from the ethnic card hitherto played so often to achieve their immediate political aims. On the other hand, it is important to point at

the role of municipalities as structures that are closer to the everyday life of inhabitants and that can be much more flexible in adjusting the general line of state policy to specific local situations.. Anyway, taking into account the experiences so far, we must recognize that quick and easy success in consolidating the Latvian society cannot be expected. Yet it is very important to make the kind of choice today that would promote a sustainable development of the Latvian state and nation.

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Chapter 8

Addressing "Health in all Policies" through Regional and Local Authorities: Results from Latvia and Norway

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Abstract

Aim: To impart experiences of "health in all policies" at local government level in Latvia and Norway. How far, and in what ways, are politicians aware of the importance of public health issues and what is the reasoning of local politicians in turning their attention to issues of health-related inequalities at local level?

Methods: This article is based on data from the HEPROGRESS project. The authors of this article conducted a qualitative evaluation of the project.

Results: In the Norwegian local authorities, lifestyle diseases and child poverty were seen as the main health challenges. In the Latvian region, alcoholism and limited access to health care services were emphasised.

Conclusions: The project gave leading politicians and administrators an opportunity to develop shared values across the politico-administrative divide and ways of

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working across sectors. Such experiences are critical in decision-making processes to achieve "health in all policies".

Key words: Public health, "health in all policies", social inequality in health

Introduction

Public health challenges have become an increasingly important political issue in Western countries despite the fact that infectious diseases no longer dominate in the Western world. Here, lifestyle-related diseases dominate and social inequality in health is a recurrent theme. One may argue that health is not only a question of life-style [1, 2, 3]. Lifestyle diseases are, however, socially unequally distributed in the population [4]. Local authorities play an important role in implementing national policies and drawing up local priorities with the aim of addressing public health challenges. This paper presents results from an evaluation of the HEPROGRESS public health project[4] managed by Østfold County Council, Norway, in partnership with local authorities in Norway and Latvia during 2011-2012. Aims of the project were to increase local and regional awareness of social inequalities in health and to support the development of local policies and interventions with the long-term objectives of reducing social and gender inequalities in health and social participation and building a more cohesive society at a local level [1]. The HEPROGRESS project was conducted in two different nations because a previous project had already demonstrated significant differences and similarities between these two countries in public health-related processes and patterns [1]. This article presents some aspects of our evalua-

[4] Østfold fylkeskommune/County Council [homepage on the Internet]. Sarpsborg: Østfold fylkeskommune. No date [cited 30 Jul 2013]. Available from http://www.ostfoldhelsa.no/files/HEPROGRESS-Prosjektbeskrivelse.pdf

tion of the HEPROGRESS project. We argue that the results from our evaluation have valuable implications for public health policy makers at regional and local government level in small and medium sized countries throughout Europe. The contribution of this paper is thus to impart and discuss experiences and assessments of an increased focus on public health.

Methods

This study is based on data from the HEPROGRESS project. The authors conducted a qualitative evaluation of the project. The data was collected from two sources. First, a brief questionnaire was distributed to the participants of the launching conference to reflect upon health-related problems, the role of social groups in the local community, and political priorities. Second, we interviewed central politicians in each participating local authority and in Norway, leading administrators as well. The selection of interviewees was based on their position in local government and their participation in the HEPROGRESS project.

Policy context

Norwegian public health policy

The overall objectives in Norwegian public health policy are "more healthy life years for the population" and to "reduce inequalities in health between social groups, ethnic groups and men and women" [2, p. 24]. Public health guidelines are developed at the national level whereas the local level provides health services and implements public policy [3]. The government has recently passed a new act on public health promotion which assigns much of the responsibility for public health work to the local authorities [4]. The act is based on "health in all policies", combating social inequality while supporting sustainable growth, the precautionary principle, and participation. The Norwegian government has introduced economic stimulus packages to

encourage partnership agreements for public health. The use of partnerships is aimed at raising awareness of public health issues and inequality in health.

According to the Norwegian act, local public health promotion work should be cross-sectorial. Such an approach aims at ensuring that health-related issues are also considered in policies other than pure health policies. The act thus contributes to a "health in all policies" strategy.

Latvian public health policy

In Latvia, the government-approved "Public Health Strategy 2012-2017" is to be considered as the main policy planning document for public health issues in Latvia. The Strategy tends to perceive public health as one of the basic values that has an impact upon quality of life, the wellbeing of the family, and society at large [5]. At the same time, the Strategy indicates that public health is a key resource for a productive and efficient economy, thus adding an economic perspective [5]. This Strategy is also based on the "health in all policies" approach, with the aim of ensuring coordination among different policies and equal access to health care services. Since there is no legislation regulating public health in Latvia, the Strategy must be assumed to be the document that defines both the directions of developments in the field and the division of responsibilities among the levels of governance where the national level develops guidelines, while the health care institutions ensure implementation of actions.

Results

Norway

When asked to state the main public health problems across Østfold County at the launching conference of HEPROGRESS, politicians mentioned drop-outs from

school, traffic congestion, air pollution caused by traffic and poor living conditions compared with other counties in Norway. The groups assumed to be most exposed to these problems are single mothers, immigrant families, the unemployed and children and young people. However, the politicians' understanding of the main public health issues changed during the following year. In the initial personal interview they focused on lifestyle diseases such as diabetes, obesity and drug and alcohol abuse in addition to child poverty. Local political action was consequently taken to improve people's health by e.g. focusing on healthy diet programmes, stop smoking courses and schemes to increase physical activity. When asked to state the main health challenges near the end of the project, the respondents drew attention to poverty, unemployment, housing and obesity among children and young people. We find that during the project period not only lifestyle problems but also poverty and unemployment are mentioned as problems to be addressed. With regard to the issue of poverty, the politicians specifically emphasise child poverty. They also agree that many people are excluded from the labour market because of their poor health. Physical inactivity among the elderly is not seen as a major public responsibility by any of the participating politicians. However, they agree that the local councils should arrange for people to move around more easily on foot or by bicycle.

Latvia

At the launching conference, Latvian local politicians pointed out that the main public health problems are limited access to health care services, low quality of health care services, alcoholism caused by unemployment, and a poor public transport system. Over the year, the politicians' perceptions of the main public health problems changed slightly. Alcoholism and lack of preventative action in public health were then mentioned as the main challenges. Here we found that politicians during the project became more aware of the role of preventative actions in health care since, as

they pointed out, the present health care system in Latvia is more tailored to diagnosis than prevention.

We also found differences in the responses of local council administrative staff received at the launching conferences and a year later; they came to see connections between various public health problems where education in self-awareness of health improvement plays a vital role. In detail, at the launching conference the administrators emphasised unemployment, addictions, and limited access to health care as the main problems. However, after a year they provided a much broader perspective on the complexity of public health care, indicating the role of information on healthy activities and the importance of financial resources. Although eight local authorities of the Vidzeme planning region were involved in the project, it appears that similar public health problems can be found everywhere else in Latvia.

Discussion

A public-health policy maker is supposed to cover a wide range of policies, as assumed by the strategy "health in all policies". For some participants the HEPROGRESS project helped to put traffic congestion and poor living conditions higher on their agenda. For others, this applied to limited access to health care and increased consciousness of the value of information about healthy activities.

At the international level, it is claimed that a "health in all policies" perspective contributes to preventing risks that involve the entire population [6]. The "health in all policies" principles imply the introduction of a horizontal governance approach at the local level. This entails that most of the health determinants that can be affected are not controlled by the health sector [7]. Examples of such determinants are level of income, income distribution, level of education, and occupation. This clearly demonstrates the cross-sector aspect of health promotion and risk prevention. Ac-

cordingly, one can argue for a need for integrating public health work in all regional and local planning. In the Norwegian context, public health profiles and health impact assessments are examples of potential instruments for cross-sectorial work. For Latvia, the development of health profiles is a new issue, and much effort will still need to be invested to overcome cross sector barriers for the implementation of "health in all policies" principles. Although the "Public Health Strategy 2012-2017" emphasises the role of public health in economic growth, it still maintains a fragmented approach to the monitoring of various public health-related factors and reports thematically (e.g. a report on child health, a report on adult health, a report on non-infectious diseases) [5]. At the same time, the "Sustainable Development Strategy of Latvia until 2030" emphasises public health as an investment in human capital [7].

The Norwegian government focuses on measures which meet local challenges. According to the Norwegian Public Health Act [4], the regional government has the overall responsibility to monitor the health situation in the counties and to acquire knowledge about factors which affect the health of the local population. Continuous health monitoring thus becomes a main instrument both at the regional and local level in order to gain insight into poor health and risk factors [8]. It is the local authorities who are responsible for providing the information. Health profiles are developed at a national level to support local governments in their work to identify major health challenges. In addition, such health profiles form the basis for planning strategies, developing objectives and measures aimed at improving public health at the local level. Put differently, the profiles form the foundation for what should be the short and long-term focus areas of local government. The Norwegian politicians referred to the health profile data as a source of information about the population's health rather than as a basis for decision-making or a tool for evaluating and select-

ing interventions. According to the act "On Local Authorities", Latvian local authorities must ensure access to health care and promote a healthy lifestyle and sport. However, the "Public Health Strategy 2012-2017" [5] excludes the local authorities in describing the institutional system of how public health actions can be implemented. The Strategy primarily concentrates on the health care institutions (like hospitals) as the main institutional resources for public health. Thus, local authorities are only involved in public health actions in so far as they show initiative in the problems and are ready to assign local funding for particular solutions required at the local level.

Norway

As mentioned above, Norwegian local politicians emphasise other main public health issues than those of the HEPROGRESS project and thus actions aimed at other social groups than the target groups of the project, e.g. drop-outs from school, physically inactive elderly people, and those excluded from the labour market because of poor health. There is, however, reason to claim that their participation in the HEPROGRESS project and cooperation with Østfold County led to new ways of thinking and ideas that could be implemented in the local authority concerned. Thus participation seems to have contributed to raising their awareness of public health issues. At the same time, the politicians pointed out that every administrative unit has a responsibility for public health care and also underlined the importance of participation by the political representatives. The use of health impact assessments in all presentation of cases for political bodies executive work – introduced in Moss during the HEPROGRESS project period – allows for discussions of public-health consequences. The impact assessments also function as a means to achieve "health in all policies" even though this term is not used by any of the respondents. It may, however, be argued that they enable politicians to see public-health aspects in other policy areas than health care.

A recently established "healthy lifestyle centre" (Frisklivssentral[5]) appears to play an important role in providing experience of different behaviour modification techniques to change dietary habits, stop smoking, and increase physical activity. In Moss, the main target group is immigrant women because the health profiles reveal that they have significant public health problems.

With regard to the problems of unemployment and exclusion from the labour market because of poor health, the politicians agreed that local authorities need to take more action than at present. However, this will also depend on the policy instruments available to local authorities that will actually have any long-term structural effects at local level. The main actions suggested by the politicians included more training for work and projects designed to help people back to work and to encourage local employers to focus on employees on long-term sick leave in addition to the long-term unemployed.

The respondents from both participating local authorities pointed out that they have been involved in major local programmes with a social inequality profile: an action plan for fighting child poverty in Hobøl and a social housing program in Moss. However, no other explicit policies on preventing social inequality in health were reported by the respondents. In Norway, poverty in the traditional sense is not a major problem compared to other countries. However, the rate of child poverty has been increasing from 2000 and onwards given an understanding of poverty which includes children's lack of opportunity to participate in society and develop on equal terms [9].

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[5] About six months after the opening of the Frisklivsentral, the local authority closed it down as part of its austerity measures.

When politicians discussed living conditions, it was mainly related to the results from the nationally run health profiles, which give information about the most vulnerable groups and in which urban areas they live. The interviewees did not have any plans for how to apply the health data, which is in line with another Norwegian study which underlines that access to health data is not sufficient for deciding what to do. Knowledge about how to translate the data into practice and evaluate different interventions is equally important [10]. On behalf of Moss City Council, the deputy mayor has now established a heterogeneous group to investigate living conditions in the different urban areas.

Latvia

Latvian politicians tended to view inequality as a social phenomenon *per se*. They are less focused on particular types of inequality e.g. health-related inequality, gender inequality, or inequality in education. However, politicians' opinions and perceptions can be influenced by a wide range of factors, ranging from the ideological positions of the politician's party to personality traits, professional background and education. Politicians are also influenced by the electoral cycle and its associated demands for achievement of tangible results. It is a quite visible tendency in Latvia that successful local politicians should be capable of covering a wide range of issues and ensuring accessibility to almost a full spectrum of public services in the local community.

The general situation in Latvia is as follows. Limited resources (mainly financial) are perceived as the major obstacle to improvements in the field of public health and other public services. This reflects the common trends in the country as the whole where the main emphasis is on the amount of resources available, not the efficient use of them. Politicians tend to create new jobs for public health issues, thus providing proof of the activities and ensuring sustainability of the actions imple-

mented. At the same time, during the interviews the politicians pointed out that the health profile data obtained during the Heprogress project are very useful for designing local development programmes which integrate public health issues. However, regarding the implementation of such programmes, politicians and administrators warn against the lack of financial resources for actions, and they partly recognise that local actions are tailored to cope with the effects rather than the causes of the problems. As the responses to the questionnaire showed, insufficient funding for the health care sector in total also has an impact on public health-related activities in other sectors.

Comparing Latvia and Norway

The evaluation suggests that the HEPROGRESS project led to greater awareness of health issues among the participants, especially about strategies related to "health in all policies." The Latvian politicians view limited resources as the major obstacle to public health improvements in their local authority. In contrast, Norwegian politicians point to specific topics such as school drop-outs, immigrant women, air pollution, traffic congestion, etc. Also, public health policies in Latvia are only recently gaining acceptance as being more than merely a part of the health care industry.

The Latvian and Norwegian politicians agree on the benefits of having attended the HEPROGRESS project. They also agree that they gained more from the first project meeting than the second and third (last) meeting in terms of what they needed, relevant knowledge and information, and the possibility to apply such knowledge and information in their work. The Norwegian politicians changed their opinions about the main public health issues during the project period while the Latvian politicians did not reveal any such change, but rather focused simply on inequality.

One of the strengths of the HEPROGRESS project is the role it gave to leading local politicians. The involvement of these politicians alongside leading administrators enhances the chances of developing shared values and concepts across the politico-administrative divide, and of developing ways of working across sectors. Such shared experiences seem to be critical during decision-making in public health politics, as indicated by research [11]. However, the possibilities of transferring these experiences to other local authorities depend on the ability of the project owner, Østfold County Council in Norway, to disseminate the experiences. This aspect of the HEPROGRESS project is also one of its limitations, in that the Latvian partners lack the opportunity to spread the same experiences to other parts of the country, mainly because of lack of resources.

Concluding remarks

The evaluation suggests that the HEPROGRESS project resulted in greater awareness among the participants about the importance of thinking "health in all policies". The participants were key public health policy makers in their communities, and in such roles they may be champions for disseminating this awareness. In so doing they can act as catalysts for the idea of "health in all policies". The use of health impact assessments may also enable a cross sector approach to public health issues and thereby also "health in all policies."

The continuous enhancement of awareness and involvement in public health issues in the two Norwegian local authorities may be demonstrated by the fact that they have both adopted social programmes directed at marginalised groups such as children and young people. The main problems to be handled are poverty, unemployment, and housing. Some of the Latvian local authorities (e.g. Amata and

Vecpiebalgas) involved in the project had adopted the development programmes for the next five to six years.

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